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POINT I: IT WAS ERROR FOR THE PERSONNEL REVIEW
BOARD TO SUBSTITUTE ITS JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS. THE BOARD'S ROLE IS
TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN THE DEPARTMENT
A: THE BOARD AND ITS HEARING OFFICERS ACT
AS APPELLATE BODIES TO DETERMINE IF AGENCY
ACTION IS SUSTAINED BY THE FACTS
B: HEARING OFFICERS AND THE BOARD ARE ONLY
EMPOWERED TO TAKE AND REVIEW EVIDENCE TO
DETERMINE WHETHER SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
EXISTS TO SUPPORT THE ACTION TAKEN BY
MANAGEMENT
C: THE DEPARTMENT HEADS AND NOT THE BOARD,
ITS HEARING OFFICERS OR THE COURTS ARE THE
BODIES TO MAKE THE DECISION ON DISCIPLINE.
THAT IS APPROPRIATELY LEFT TO THE AGENCY
HEADS
D: THE BOARD, HEARING OFFICERS AND COURTS
ARE NOT TO IMPOSE THEIR JUDGMENTS FOR
THOSE OF THE AGENCY HEADS. TO DO SO
IS REVERSIBLE ERROR
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E: THE BOARD DID SUBSTITUTE ITS JUDGMENT.
IT PLACED ITSELF IN THE ROLE OF A "SUPER
AGENCY," APPLIED THE WRONG STANDARD FOR
DETERMINING PENALTY AND USURPED THE
AUTHORITY OF THE DEPARTMENT HEAD, ALL IN
CONTRAVENTION TO BOTH ITS AUTHORITY AND
ROLE
POINT II: THE PENALTY WAS A REASONABLE PENALTY
AND NEITHER "SHOCKS ONE'S SENSE OF FAIRNESS"
NOR CAN BE CONSIDERED AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
AS SUCH, THE BOARD'S OVERTURNING OF THE DECISION
OF THE DEPARTMENT HEAD AND IMPOSING A FIFTEEN
MONTH SUSPENSION IN LIEU OF TERMINATION IS
ERROR AS A MATTER OF LAW AND MUST BE OVERTURNED
BY THIS COURT
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14

A: THE STANDARD IS A HIGH STANDARD
REQUIRING THAT ACTIONS BE SO VIOLATIVE
OF REASON AS TO BE ABUSIVE .
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DECISION
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POINT III: THE PERSONNEL REVIEW BOARD ACTED
BEYOND ITS GRANT OF AUTHORITY BY IMPOSING ITS
OWN PENALTY
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POINT IV: THE PERSONNEL REVIEW BOARD IMPROPERLY
AND PREJUDICIALLY RELIED ON THE ISSUE OF AIDS
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Utah Code Annotated §63-46B-16 confers jurisdiction upon the Supreme
Court or other appellate courts designated by statute to review all final agency
actions resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings. Utah Code Annotated
§78-2a-3(2)(a) grants jurisdiction to the Utah Court of Appeals to review the final
orders and decrees of state and local agencies.

NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This appeal is from the final decision of the Utah Personnel Review Board,
an administrative agency of the State of Utah.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issues presented on appeal are as follows:
1.

May the Personnel Review Board substitute it's own judgment for that

of a department head, in a termination matter, when the department head has not
abused his discretion in imposing discipline?
2.

May the Personnel Review Board overturn the penalty of termination

imposed by a department head, when the penalty does not "shock one's sense of
fairness" and is not an "abuse of discretion"?
3.

May the Personnel Review Board ignore the limitations on penalty

provided for by rule as they relate to the departments of State Government and
impose its own penalty greater than what agency's may impose and which itself
seems excessive and an abuse of the Board's discretion?
4.

Is it reversible error for the Personnel Review Board to rely on

irrelevant evidence and issues to reach its own legal conclusion as justification to
substitute a different penalty for that imposed by the department head?

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The statutes, rules and cases believed by appellant to be dispositive
of the issues in appellant's favor are as follows:
STATUTES:
Utah Code Annotated § 67-19-18, 1953 as Amended
Utah Code Annotated § 67-19-20, 1953 as Amended
Utah Code Annotated § 67-19-21, 1953 as Amended
Utah Code Annotated § 67-19-25, 1953 as Amended
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES:
Utah Administrative Code, R20-11-1, (1987-1988)
Utah Administrative Code, R20-11-2, (1987-1988)
Utah Administrative Code, R665-1-25 (1987-1988)
Utah Administrative Code, R665-1-26 (1987-1988)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
CASE NATURE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION
After investigation and hearings provided by the Utah Department of
Corrections, Utah State Prison, Paul Sucher was terminated from employment by
Gary Deland, Executive Director of the Department of Corrections. Mr. Sucher
appealed the decision of termination to the Personnel Review Board. A hearing
officer held an evidentiary hearing and issued a decision under date of January 12,
1988 sustaining the decision of the department head, Mr. Deland.
Mr. Sucher appealed the hearing officer's decision sustaining the
department head to the Personnel Review Board. The Board adopted all Findings
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of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the hearing officer, but overturned the decision
of termination and imposed boath a suspension without pay or benefit's of
approximately 15 months and demotion, ordering reinstatement of Mr. Sucher as
of December 20, 1988.
The Department of Corrections, Utah State Prison appeals the
decision of reinstatement and modification of the penalty.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Seeing that there are several volumes of the hearing transcript, the various
citations will be designated in abbreviated form. For example, Volume 2, page 25
will be cited as (2:25) or Volume 4, pages 30-35 will be cited as (4:30-35), etc.
Paul S. Sucher was a career service employee of The Utah Department of
Corrections. He was hired as a Corrections Officer on October 28, 1976. He held
peace officer status as part of his employment as a Corrections Officer. He was
appointed to the rank of Lieutenant, a supervisory position, on January 1, 1984.
(4:3) His overall performance evaluation was above standard during his
employment. (3:168)
He received a Formal Warning letter, dated May 18, 1989, advising him that
his performance as shift leader during an escape attempt on February 3, 1987,
was unsatisfactory. (1:38-39). The letter was to be considered in his next
performance rating.
On June 19, 1987, Inmate Greg Loya plugged the toilet and flooded
his cell in the Young Adult Correctional Facility, Starr 1. When his cell was opened,
Loya walked out of his cell and exited the Starr 1 facility (1:73). At this time
Captain Bona rang the signal for all inmates to return to their housing units (1:132,
134). Loya approached Central Control where he was met by Captain Bona, Lt.
Sucher, and Officers White, Blocker and Moody.
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Sucher was ordered to place handcuffs on Loya. He did so with little
difficulty (3:129). Loya was then ordered back to his cell. He became extremely
agitated. He was placed in leg irons after a struggle (3:131). Officers Moody and
Sucher were kicked during the struggle (3:131). Loya continued to refuse to return
to his cell after he had been restrained by handcuffs and leg irons (1:77). He was
then carried by four officers, one on each limb (1:79). Sucher was holding Loya's
right leg (1:78). After moving a short distance, Loya moved to a sitting position
and spat in Sucher's face (1:80, 2:132). Sucher retaliated by striking Loya in the
mouth as Loya re-gathered spit (1:81). Loya's mouth was bleeding after Sucher's
blow (1:167). Sucher prepared to strike a second time. Officer White yelled for
him to stop, which he did (1:81, 82). Loya then spit a second time in Sucher's face
(1:114). Sucher released Loya's leg and left to wash his face. As he left he
shouted something to the effect he was going to charge Loya with assault with a
deadly weapon (3:132). Loya was turned face down to prevent further spitting.
After being carried for a short distance, he was allowed to walk and return to his
cell without further incident (1:82).
Since the appointment on July 1, 1985, of Gary W. DeLand as
Executive Director of the Department of Corrections, a Department of Corrections
Manual of Policy and Procedures has been adopted and the policy and procedural
rules have been strictly enforced (1:95, 249-50, 3:3-13). Sucher had been issued
a copy of the Manual of Policy and Procedures (2;19-20). He had also attended at
least one training session on the use of force (2:60).
On July 22 and 27, 1987, an administrative hearing was conducted by
Utah Department of Corrections Administrative Law Judge Toby Jacquez. Judge
Jacquez submitted his recommendation to the Executive Director on August 17,
1987. Based on the facts he found and a previous disciplinary case, he
recommended punishment ranging from a demotion and thirty days off to
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termination. He stated that if Sucher was not terminated, he should be referred for
counseling and transferred to a duty station limiting interaction with offenders. His
recommendations were forwarded to the Director of Institutional Operations, David
Franchina, and to Warden Jeff Galli.
Director Franchina and Warden Galli recommended Sucher be
terminated. Sucher appealed to the Executive Director. On September 1, 1987,
Sucher and Utah Public Employees representative Ray Taylor appeared to argue
for sanctions less than termination. On September 9, 1987, Mr. Taylor was given
an opportunity to review a draft of the Final Order. On September 11, 1987, Mr.
Taylor indicated the Final Order should be issued. On September 14, 1987, the
Final Order was issued, terminating Mr. Sucher's employment.
Following his termination, Mr. Sucher appealed to the Personnel
Review Board. A hearing was held on November 24, 25, 30, and December 4,
1987 before H. Wright Volker, a Hearing Officer of the Personnel Review Board.
On January 8, 1988, he issued his decision. He found substantial evidence
establishing Sucher committed the acts complained of. He further found the
mitigating circumstances did not present a sound basis for modifying the decision
to terminate Mr. Sucher. (Hearing Officer Decision)
Mr. Sucher appealed that the decision to Personnel Review Board.
The Board convened on December 13, 1988 for an appellate review. It denied
Sucher's motion to consider new evidence. It also determined the Step 5 (Mr.
Volker's) findings of fact to be accurate and to have been correctly applied to the
law. (PRB Decision, p.12) The Board overturned the termination but imposed a 15
month suspension without pay, benefits and seniority, ordered a demotion and
ordered Sucher's reinstatement. The Department of Corrections appeals the
Board's decision.

— Y —

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I: The role of the Personnel Review Board (Board) is to be an
//

appellate,/ review body. It is to determine whether there is substantial evidence

presented by the department head to justify the disciplinary action taken. The
Board is not authorized to substitute its judgment as to what it would have done
had it been the department head. Because the Board did impose its own sanction
by substituting its judgment, it abused its authority and discretion.
POINT II: The penalty imposed by the department head neither ''shocks
one's sense of fairness" nor can be considered an abuse of discretion. As such,
there was no basis for the Board to overturn the termination and impose its own
extensive penalty which included reinstatement.
POINT III: The Board cannot create or invent penalties that do not exist in
law or rule. It also cannot impose a penalty greater than what is authorized for
department heads to impose. Agencies are limited to 30 calendar day
suspensions, yet the Board imposed a 15 month suspension, clearly outside its
scope of authority and not in accordance with any rule or statute. This constitutes
an abuse of discretion.
POINT IV: The Board relied on the lack of AIDS training as the basis to
modify the punishment. This was reversible error since there was never any
showing that such training was relevant to Suchers unwarranted use of "excessive
force," "retaliation," and inappropriate behavior. The Board cited no evidence or
portion of the record that en sustain such a reversal of the hearing officer "as a
matter of law." Such action of the board is arbitrary and an abuse of its discretion.
There was simply no evidence in the record to support its unwarranted imposition
of its own philosophical position.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE PERSONNEL
REVIEW BOARD TO SUBSTITUTE ITS
JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS. THE BOARD'S ROLE IS TO
DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN THE DEPARTMENT
A.
THE BOARD AND ITS HEARING
OFFICERS ACT AS APPELLATE
BODIES TO DETERMINE IF
AGENCY ACTION IS SUSTAINED
BY THE FACTS.
The Personnel Review Board (Board) in rendering its decision
substituted its judgment for that of the agency in contravention to both its role and
its authority. The Board not only rejected the agency's decision, but relied on an
irrelevant reading of its role in these matters. As such, this Court must reverse the
Board as a matter of law.
Utah Code Annotated §67-19-18 sets forth clearly the authority to
impose the penalty of termination for "just cause." The responsibility for not only
that determination, but the act of termination rests solely with the department head
of the employing department. §67-19-18(3)(d) specifically states: "Following the
hearing an employee may be dismissed or demoted if the department head finds
adequate cause or reason" (Emphasis added). Section 18(1) further provides that
the director of the Department of Human Resource Management (DHRM) "shall"
promulgate rules governing the procedural requirements. These rules are found in
the State of Utah Personnel Management Rules at R20-11-1 et. s_e_g. These rules
clearly state, as per Rule R20-11 -2.(2), that it is the department head that
determines whether there is cause and makes the termination decision.
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Counsel can find no statutory authority empowering the Board or its
hearing officer to make the decision to terminate or discipline employees. The
Board has limited jurisdiction - to act as an appellate body to "review" the actions
taken by management. Utah Code Annotated §67-19-20(5)(a) and (b) set forth the
responsibilities of the Board as follows:
(a) to serve as a quasi-judicial body to hear appeals
from employees directly affected by actions taken under
authority granted by this chapter to the director or to
agencies on matters pertaining to...dismissals...and
disciplinary actions;
(b) to serve as the final administrative appeal body...
(Emphasis added)
If appealed, a matter goes before a hearing officer who conducts an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether there is "substantial evidence" to sustain
management's decision. The transcript of the proceedings along with the exhibits
entered into evidence constitute the "record of the hearing." (See § 6 7 - 1 9 25(5)(c)).
It is clear that what is being reviewed by the Board hearing officer,
then, is the agency decision.

B
HEARING OFFICERS AND THE BOARD
ARE ONLY EMPOWERED TO TAKE AND
REVIEW EVIDENCE TO DETERMINE
WHETHER SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE EXISTS
TO SUPPORT THE ACTION TAKEN
BY MANAGEMENT.
According to Utah Code Annotated §67-19-25(d)(i): 'The state has
the burden of proof in all appeals resulting from dismissals..." In essence, the
hearing officer and ultimately the Board determine whether the state has met the
burden of proof to sustain the agency action.

Rule R665-1 -25.3.2 of the Board rules clearly identifies the purpose
for evidentiary hearings: ''An evidentiary proceeding is intended solely for the
purpose of receiving evidence which either refutes or substantiates specific claims
or charges."
Rule R665-25.4 further clarifies the purpose:
An evidentiary/Step 5 hearing shall be a new hearing on
the record...The Hearing Officer shall give latitude and
deference to an agency's prior decision when the latter
was supported by the findings of fact based on the
evidence. (Emphasis added)
Rule R665-25-6 establishes the standard of proof for all hearings as
follows:
"In all hearings the standard of proof (i.e., quantum of
proof or evidentiary standard) is the substantial evidence
standard." (Emphasis added).
The Nebraska Supreme Court in Monie v. State Personnel Board, 424
N.W.2d 874 (Neb. 1988) dealt with this exact issue. The District Court had
overturned an agency's decision to terminate an employee with substantially more
"mitigating" factors in his favor than The Utah Board found for Sucher. The
Nebraska Court reinstated the termination by clearly chiding The Court for not
applying the proper scope of review of The Personnel Board (the equivalent of the
PRB). The Court said:
The scope of review of the Personnel Board
is to decide whether the decision to terminate
was made in good faith and for cause, and to
insure that the agency head followed proper
procedures under state personnel and/or agency
rules and regulations, labor agreements, or
relevant statutes.
Evidence is permitted for this purpose and not to allow the board to
establish policy or interpose its own judgment. Simply put, if there is "substantial
evidence", the decision of the department head must be sustained. If substantial
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evidence does not exist, the department head has abused his discretion and the
decision should be overturned.
U.C.A. §67-19-18(1) sets forth the grounds upon which termination
may be made. Counsel concedes that not every action taken by employees that
fits into one of the enumerated categories is deserving of termination. It is certainly
dependent on the circumstances. Lesser actions deserve lesser punishment,
hence, Rule R20-11-1.(4) provides for written reprimands, suspensions, demotions
as well as terminations.
C
THE DEPARTMENT HEADS AND NOT
THE BOARD, ITS HEARING OFFICERS
OR THE COURTS ARE THE BODIES TO
MAKE THE DECISION ON DISCIPLINE.
THAT IS APPROPRIATELY LEFT TO
THE AGENCY HEADS.
The decision of what action to take must be made by those who are
in charge of the departments where inappropriate conduct happens. It is the
department heads that have been appointed and given this responsibility. The
Board or its hearing officers have no such authority.
An early Utah case, Fowler v. Gillman, 76 Utah 414, 290 P. 358 (Utah
1930), clearly establishes that a sheriff (department head) is the one to make the
decision to dismiss a deputy where the deputy "has been guilty of misconduct..."
Appellant Department of Corrections simply maintains the same posture: the
misconduct and gravity of it must be determined by the presiding officer of the
agency - the department head. Unless there is an abuse of discretion, the
department head must be given the latitude to make the "tough" decisions
necessary to run and control his agency.
The controlling Utah case in this area is Matter of Discharge of Jones,
720 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1986). A deputy sheriff who misused his position through

deception to obtain property of an arrested party was terminated. The Merit
Commission reinstated the deputy. The Sheriff appealed and the Supreme Court
eventually reinstated the dismissal:
The sheriff must manage and direct his deputies, and is
in the best position to know whether their actions merit
discipline. If the Merit Commission finds upon review that
the facts support the charges against the deputy, then it
must affirm the sheriff's disciplinary action, unless it finds
the sanction so clearly disproportionate to the charges as
to amount to an abuse of the sheriff's discretion.
(Emphasis Added)
Utah is not the only jurisdiction that has adopted this position. The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals of Louisiana in City of Kenner v. Pritchett, 432 So.2d
971 (La.App.5 Cir. 1983) stated:
A chief of police, charged with the operation of running
his department, must do so to the best of his ability. He
has the discretion to take disciplinary actions when there
exists sufficient cause for such action and, accordingly,
is answerable for departmental actions...Because an
officer is the first to be terminated for violation of
departmental rules does not alone constitute bad faith.
To hold that the appointing authority acted in bad faith
would in effect tie the hands of the chief of police (or
supervisor) in such matters.
D

THE BOARD, HEARING OFFICERS AND
COURTS ARE NOT TO IMPOSE THEIR JUDGMENTS
FOR THOSE OF THE AGENCY HEADS. TO
DO SO IS REVERSIBLE ERROR.
In Graybill v. United States Postal Service, 782 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir.
1986) the court ruled that "Our function is not to conduct a de novo review of
agency disciplinary proceedings in order to determine what penalty we might have
imposed..." Again, the Federal Circuit in Beard v. General Services Administration,
801 F.2d 1318 (Fed.Cir. 1986) stated that: "We have frequently recognized in
cases arising under the Civil Service Reform Act that '[determination of an

appropriate penalty is a matter committed primarily to the sound discretion of the
employing agency"' (citation omitted)
The leading Utah case on point is Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment of
Salt Lake City, 685 P 2d 1032 (Utah 1984)

In this case, The Board entered a

decision after a hearing where no formal record or transcript was kept

On appeal,

evidence was taken so as to determine what the facts were upon which the Board
relied. The District Court reversed The Board holding that in a "plenary' action it
had the same power as The Board — in essence, could render a decision as if it
were the Board

The Supreme Court reversed The District Court and sustained

The Board's decision

In clear and specific language, The Court held that appellate

review bodies are not to substitute their judgment for that of the agencies who are
the bodies by law to make the decisions

The Court said

In the case at hand, the district judge
undertook to weigh anew the underlying factual
considerations While there may have been some
evidence in the record to support the trial
judge's findings, it was not his prerogative to
weigh the evidence anew His role was limited
to determining whether there was evidence in the
record to support the Board of Adjustment's
action The judge went beyond this role and
decided the case according to his notion of
what was in the best interests of the citizens
of Salt Lake City...it does not matter whether the
judge agrees or disagrees with the rationale
of the Board or the policy grounds upon which
a decision is based. It does not he within
the prerogative of the trial court to substitute
its judgment for that of the Board where the
record discloses a reasonable basis for the
Board's decision. (Emphasis added)
The Board did substitute its judgment in contravention to this clear
statement from The Court. It did so by imposing its belief that AIDS training
should be given in corrections and that the lack of it justified overturning the
Department's decision. Just as The District Court judge, above, wanted to

determine what Salt Lake City should do, the Board wanted to do so regarding
AIDS training. Both are improper uses of appellate authority.
Other jurisdictions have concurred in this position. In DeGroot v.
Arizona Racing Commission, 686 P.2d 1301 (Ariz.App. 1984), the Court of Appeals
stated: "A trial court may not function as a 'super agency' and substitute its own
judgment for that of the agency where factual questions and agency expertise is
involved."
Again, the Washington Court of Appeals in Clark v. Central Kitsap
School District, 38 Wash.App. 560, 686 P.2d 514 (Wash.App. 1984) held:
In reaching this conclusion the court looked carefully at
the statutes and found that they vest no discretion in the
trial court insofar as appropriate sanction is concerned,
once sufficient cause for discharge is found. The
statutes do not reflect a legislative intent to make the
superior courts a super school board in the area of
retention or discharge of teachers...'
...Once sufficient cause for discharge has been found,
the question of whether discharge is appropriate is a
policy decision...Such matters involve policy
considerations within the exclusive purview of the board,
not the trial court or jury. Neither judge nor jury is entitled
to usurp the powers and authority of the duly elected
board members once the board has satisfied the laws
respecting discharge. (Emphasis added)
In a leading case from Pennsylvania, O'Gorman's Appeal',409 Pa. 571,
187 A.2d 581 (Pa. 1963), the court stated:
What constitutes ample Oust] cause for removal...must
necessarily be largely a matter of discretion on the part
of the head of the department...
...All the law requires is that the cause be not religious
or political, but concerned solely with the inefficiency,
delinquency or misconduct of the employee. A wide
latitude must be left to the superior officer - in fact a
discretion conditioned on its exercise in good faith and
not as a screen for some reason not based upon the
fitness of the employee to fill the position. (Emphasis
added)

In discussing this role of the agency, the United States Supreme
Court had occasion to rule on the role of the National Labor Relation Board in
applying the "substantial evidence" standard as it related to personnel actions,
Universal Camera Corp v. NLRB 340 U.S. 474 (1951):
To be sure, the requirement for canvassing 'the whole
recording order to ascertain substantiality does not
furnish a calculus of value by which [the Board]...can
assess the evidence. Nor was it intended to negative the
function of...agencies presumably equipped or informed
by experience to deal with a specialized field of
knowledge, whose findings in that field carry the authority
of an expertise which [the Board does]...not possess and
therefore must respect. Nor does it mean that even as to
matters not requiring expertise [the Board]...may displace
the [agency's],..choice between two fairly conflicting
views, even though the [Board]...would justifiably have
made a different choice...Congress has merely made it
clear that [the Board]... is not precluded from setting
aside [an agency]...decision when it cannot
conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that
decision is substantial, when viewed in the light that the
record in its entirety furnishes, including the body of
evidence opposed to the [agency's]...view (Emphasis
added).
The Federal Merit System Protection Board has also dealt with this
subject in the case Parker v. Defense Logistics Agency, 1 MSPB 489 (1980):
Unlike the preponderance standard, which requires
evidence that a reasonable person would accept as
sufficient to find a contested fact more probably true
than untrue, the substantial evidence standard requires
only evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable
and fair-minded persons in exercising impartial judgment
might reach different conclusions. This standard
precludes the Board's presiding official from substituting
his or her own judgment from that of the agency. It
obliges the presiding official to determine not only
whether, in light of all relevant and credible evidence
before the Board, a reasonable person could agree with
the agency's decision (even though other reasonable
persons including the presiding official might disagree
with that decision). (Emphasis added)
The Utah Supreme Court in Utah State Road Commission v. Steele
Ranch, 535 P.2d 888 (Utah 1975) also addressed the issue that under this

standard, (substantial evidence), all that is needed to sustain the decision [penalty] - is some credible evidence. The Court said:
Allowance should be made for the fact that there is a
comparatively wide orbit through which reasonable minds
may swing; and that what may be considered reasonable
in the broad sense need not necessarily fit into the exact
pattern of our own thought...the requirement is that the
evidence must be sufficient in amount and credibility
that, when considered in connection with the other
evidence and circumstances shown in the case, would
justify some, but not necessarily all, reasonable minds
acting fairly thereon, to believe it to be the truth.
The hearing officer determines what the facts are and whether there
is "substantial evidence" to sustain the department head. The Board thus becomes
purely an "appellate body" just as the courts do. The Board cannot substitute its
judgment just as the courts cannot substitute their judgment. If the Board does so,
or issues a decision that either misinterprets its role or the legal conclusions
reached, it is incumbent on the Courts to correct that error and impose the
decision that was imposed by the agency.
E
THE BOARD DID SUBSTITUTE ITS JUDGEMENT.
IT PLACED ITSELF IN THE ROLE OF A
"SUPER AGENCY," APPLIED THE WRONG
STANDARD FOR DETERMINING PENALTY
AND USURPED THE AUTHORITY OF THE
DEPARTMENT HEAD, ALL IN CONTRAVENTION
TO BOTH ITS AUTHORITY AND ROLE.
In the Board's "FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS", Part A., the Board
adopted the factual findings of its hearing officer and found no error in any of
them, adopting them as the Board's own: 'The Step 5 findings of facts are
determined to be accurate and to have been correctly applied to the law."
(Emphasis added). The Board then went on to make several other significant
findings:
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B.1. While Sucher had a "subjective fear of aide, "We
further find, however, that Sucher was not singularly
motivated by an interest in his self defense as he
claimed, but that he lunged forward, swung at, and hit
Loya in the mouth area with his fist as a retaliatory act
for having been spit upon by the inmate."
B.3. "Sucher's conduct of striking Loya in the mouth, in
light of the totality of the circumstances, was not
appropriate or reasonable, but rather his act of punching
Loya constituted excessive force.
B.4. "The evidentiary examiner's conclusion and ruling
was neither arbitrary nor capricious..."
B.5. "Appellant asserted that his act of striking Loya
subsequent to being spit upon was one of self defense.
We do not agree...Sucher committed an act of retaliation
for having been spit upon in the facial area by
Loya...Sucher's reliance upon a self defense claim is
found to have been unreasonable, without merit, and
wholly inappropriate as a response." (Emphasis added in
all sections)
The Utah Supreme Court, in Discharge of Jones, supra, specifically
held that the standard in Utah is:
If the Merit Commission [Personnel Review Board] finds
upon review that the facts support the charges against
the deputy [Sucher], then it must affirm the sheriff's
disciplinary action, unless it finds the sanction so clearly
disproportionate to the charges as to amount to an
abuse of the sheriff's discretion. (Emphasis added).
The Board did not follow this standard, but applied its own and
thereby substituted its judgment for that of the department head and in
contravention to its role as an appellate body. The Board held that because there
had not been AIDs training, the punishment was "excessive" even though the
Board declared the acts of Sucher "retaliatory," "excessive force," and any claim
for self defense [i.e. fear of aids] as "unreasonable, without merit, and wholly
inappropriate as a response," and that the hearing officer's ruling was not
"arbitrary nor capricious." "Excessive" is not necessarily equivalent to "abuse of
discretion" as required by Jones. It can be, but for the Board to simply rely on
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what it considers "excessive" is itself an abuse of the Board's authority. A great
danger is created by establishing the Board as a "super agency." Punishments
are then always subject to the whim of the Board. Unless an agency's decision is
clearly an "abuse of discretion" [discussed in the next argument], the Board has no
right or authority to sit in judgment of what it considers as "excessive" in
comparison to what the agency feels is proper.
The Utah Supreme Court in Salt Lake City Corporation v. Department
of Employment Security, 657 P.2d 1312 (Utah 1982) specifically held that the
courts [here the Board really is acting as a court ("quasi-judicial body") to hear
appeals] not substitute their judgment for that of the agency"
...where the language of a statute indicates
a legislative intention to commit broad
discretion to an agency to effectuate the
purposes of the legislative scheme, we will
not substitute our judgment for that of the
agency as long as the commission's
interpretation has 'warrant in the record'
and a 'reasonable basis in the law'.
There is no question that the Department heads have been given a
broad grant of authority and the discretion to determine discipline. As the Court
stated, as long as there is a "reasonable basis in law" and sufficient "warrant in
the record" the courts [Board] is not at liberty to substitute its judgment for that of
the agency head.
The California Supreme Court in Nightingale v. State Personnel Board,
102 Cal.Rptr. 758, 498 P.2d 1006 (Cal 1972) held that "...it is well settled that in
reviewing the penalty imposed by an administrative body [personnel action], neither
a trial court nor an appellate court is free to substitute its own discretion as to the
matter."
An Arizona Court of Appeals stated in Webster v. State Board of
Regents, 599 P.2d 816 (Ariz. App. 1979) that:
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The trial judge may not merely substitute his
judgment for that of the administrative
agency involved. Instead, before a reversal
is justified, the trial court must find that
the agency has acted arbitrarily, capriciously.
or has abused it discretion...[citation omitted]
In the resolution of factual issues, this standard requires a determination of whether there
was substantial evidence to support the agency's
decision.
Brown v. Sexner, 85 lll.App.3d 139, 405 N.E.2d 1082 (III.App. 1980)
found that court discussing the role of a police agency [which the Department of
Corrections is]:
Because there is no statutory definition of cause,
whether a charge is sufficient cause for discharge is
generally for the agency to determine...A police board
[department head] has considerable latitude in
determining what constitutes cause for discharge and its
decision will not be reversed unless its finding is
unrelated to the requirements of the service or so trivial
as to be unreasonable.
The Eastern District for California in Diaz v. U.S. Postal Service, 658
F.Supp. 484 (E.D.Cal. 1987) stated in a termination case:
Discretion in disciplinary matters has long been held to
rest with the administrative agency, and the Court may
not reweigh the evidence or substitute its own judgment
for that of an agency determination adequately
supported...[citations omitted].
While many others could be cited, there is clear support that the
Board, sitting in the position of a reviewing appellate body, must sustain the
decision of the agency, just like the hearing officers must do if there is substantial
evidence, regardless of whether the Board disagrees with that decision.
It is quite clear that the Board does not like the fact that the
Department of Corrections had not done training in AIDS prevention and/or dealing
with issues regarding this disease. Finding B.2. specifically "chides" the
Department for failing to provide training before the incident stating that "the

Agency did not show that proper training, orientation, or educational instruction
regarding AIDS in a custodial setting had been offered." The Board, however,
specifically found that Sucher's subjective fears of AIDS regarding spitting were
"misguided as well as unreasonable (PRB Decision, P.14) Sucher's acts were
"retaliatory" for being spit upon, were "excessive force" unjustified in any manner
and form, were not "self defense" and his claims were "unreasonable, without
merit, and wholly inappropriate as a response."
Nowhere in the Board's entire opinion is there any claim, finding or
conclusion of the Board that such training would have made any difference in
"retaliatory strikes," "excessive force," or "offensive" (versus self defense) actions
involving Loya, a totally shackled and restrained inmate. It is obvious, as a matter
of law, that the Board wanted the Department to institute AIDS training. It made a
policy decision - something the Utah Supreme Court in Xanthos, supra, totally
rejected as being inappropriate. The Board simply imposed its own penalty to
"send the message" to the Department that it had better "shape up" and provide
AIDS training. This is clearly an abuse of discretion on the part of the Board. To
sustain this action of the Board would in essence be saying that any time the
Board does not like a policy of an agency or wants to change the policy, it simply
needs to overturn a discipline because the agency didn't do what the Board likes
or that no matter what an employee does, if the employee can establish that some
training could have been given, but wasn't, the "totality" of the circumstances
would not justify termination. This is an improper usurption of authority. This
expressed position of the Board is not only wrong, but is an intrusion into the role
of the agencies. It is our improper usurption of authority.
The fact that AIDS is a disease that is currently receiving headlines in
the news media is not justification to throw out justifiable grounds simply because
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the Board desired to send a message and felt that had it been the department
head it would have done something different. There is no justification in the record.
As a matter of law, this Court must correct the error of the Board.
Upon review of the agency decision, the hearing officer found substantial evidence
to support the decision of termination. He correctly determined his role to review
that action in light of seeing whether the evidence supported the action. The Board
on the other hand is the entity that created error in substituting its judgment for
that of the agency, applying the wrong standard, relying on irrelevant information,
and exceeding its jurisdiction in issuing a suspension not authorized or permitted
by law or rule.
POINT II
THE PENALTY WAS A REASONABLE PENALTY
AND NEITHER "SHOCKS ONE'S SENSE OF FAIRNESS"
NOR CAN BE CONSIDERED AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
AS SUCH, THE BOARD'S OVERTURNING OF THE
DECISION OF THE DEPARTMENT HEAD AND IMPOSING
A FIFTEEN MONTH SUSPENSION IN LIEU OF
TERMINATION IS ERROR AS A MATTER OF LAW
AND MUST BE OVERTURNED BY THIS COURT.
A
THE STANDARD IS A HIGH
STANDARD REQUIRING THAT
ACTIONS BE SO VIOLATIVE OF
REASON AS TO BE ABUSIVE.
The reasonableness of the action taken by the department head
centers on the fact that we are dealing with a segment of the state workforce that
is expected and required to live by a higher standard than other "non-law
enforcement" employees. Matter of Jones, supra, clearly points this out wherein
the Supreme Court cites the Law Enforcement Code of Ethics at length. That Code
contains provisions and requirements every law enforcement officer takes upon
him/herself when entering service. To Counsel's knowledge no other state

employees take upon them such an all encompassing "code of ethics." As such,
the standard is distinctly higher for those who so serve. Among the important
parts of that code that are applicable to this matter are the following [the entire
code is contained in the appendix]:
...my fundamental duty is to serve mankind: to
safeguard lives and property:
/ will...develop self-restraint:...I will be exemplary in
obeying the laws of the land and the regulations of my
department...
I will never act officiously or permit personal feelings,
prejudices, animosities or friendship to influence my
decisions... never employing unnecessary force or
violence...
/ recognize the badge of my office as a symbol of public
faith, and I accept it as a public trust to be held so long
as I am true to the ethics of the police service...
(Emphasis added)
Certainly, this ethics code, as supported and emphasized by the Utah
Supreme Court, places a high standard on those assigned in this very important
area of public trust. The case of Newcomer v. Civil Service Commission of
Fairchance Borough, 515 A.2d 108 (Pa.CmwIth. 1986) summarizes this position as
follows:
This Court has held that the conduct of law enforcement
personnel must be "above reproach." Law enforcement
officers are properly required to adhere to demanding
standards which are higher than those applied to many
other professions. (Emphasis added)
It is this role of Mr. Sucher and other law enforcement officers that
must be taken into consideration when the "reasonableness" of the punishment is
assessed. It is this role that has led courts throughout the country to hold actions
of "excessive force" and "hitting shackled inmates" as reasonable, just grounds to
sustain terminations. For such disciplinary measures, the agency "has the primary
responsibility and discretion for determining whether or not and how a police
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officer should be disciplined," Newcomer, id. It is that discretion that is sustained
as long as the discipline neither "shocks one's sense of fairness," is not "arbitrary
or capricious," or is not an "abuse of discretion "
New York has been on the leading edge in helping to focus on
whether punishments should be overturned or modified A New York court, in
discussing this issue offered the following caution in O'Shea v. Martin, 34 Misc 2d
987, 230 N Y.S.2d 935 (1962). The court stated
...a judicial review of the penalty imposed must be
exercised with great caution The respondents have, to a
large degree, the responsibility for the maintenance of
proper discipline of the members of the police force and
their maintenance of a sense of obligation to the
positions they hold These are heavy responsibilities and
when it appears, as here, that the respondents acted in
good faith, had a reasonable basis for the action taken, it
should not and will not be disturbed by this court
(Emphasis added)
One of the leading cases that establishes the standard as to what is
"a reasonable basis" is the case Pell v. Board of Education, 34 N Y.2d 222, 356
N.Y.S.2d 833 (N Y.Ct App. 1974):
But, where the finding of guilt is confirmed and
punishment has been imposed, the test is whether such
punishment is "so disproportionate to the offense, in the
light of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one's
sense of fairness". (Emphasis added)
The court, realizing that this terminology leaves a lot to be desired,
expounded on its interpretation:
Of course, terminology like "shocking to one's sense of
fairness" reflects a purely subjective response to the
situation presented and is hardly satisfactory. Yet its
usage has persisted for many years and through many
cases. Obviously, such language reflects difficulty in
articulating an objective standard. At this time, it may be
ventured that a result is shocking to one's sense of
fairness if the sanction imposed is so grave in its impact
on the individual subjected to it that it is disproportionate
to the misconduct, incompetence, failure or turpitude of
the individual, or to the harm or risk of harm to the
agency or institution, or to the public generally visited or
threatened by the derelictions of the individuals...
_ i « _

...Paramount too, in cases of sanctions for agencies
like the police, is the principle that it is the agency and
not the courts which, before the public must justify the
integrity and efficiency of their operations. (Emphasis
added)
Some might say that this standard is not what applies in Utah, and
even Counsel for the Department has cited the ''abuse of discretion" standard in
the previous argument. It should be pointed out, however, that "abuse of
discretion" and "shocking to one's sense of fairness" are basically the same
standard. Counsel cannot picture one without the other. Certainly if a punishment
shocks one's sense of fairness, the agency would have "abused its discretion" and
vice-versa.
The Utah Supreme Court has, however, maintained that the elements
of "abusing discretion" are pretty much the same as those the New York Court
discussed. In Rushton v. Gelco Express, 732 P.2d 109 (Utah 1986) the Court
stated that it would "not disturb the findings and orders of the [Industrial]
Commission unless they are arbitrary and capricious, and they are arbitrary and
capricious when they are contrary to the evidence or without any reasonable basis
in the evidence." (Emphasis added). The Court had previously held that the courts
should not intrude or interfere with the decisions unless "the action is so
oppressive or unreasonable that it must be deemed capricious and arbitrary, or the
agency has in some way acted contrary to law or in excess of its authority."
(Emphasis added) Petty v. Board of Regents, 595 P.2d 1299 (Utah 1979).
Certainly, arbitrary and capricious as terms used in the law, mean that
there is no justifiable reason or facts upon which to base a decision. Blacks Law
Dictionary. Revised Fourth Edition, West Publishing Company (1968) says of
"arbitrary": ..."without adequate determining principle; not founded in the nature of
things; nonrational; not done or acting according to reason or judgment..." Blacks
further defines "abuse of discretion" as: "'Abuse of discretion' is synonymous with
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a failure to exercise a sound, reasonable, and legal discretion...but means the
clearly erroneous conclusion and judgment - one that is clearly against logic and
effect of such facts as are presented../'
There is little difference between these two definitions and how the
courts have viewed them. While there are indeed subtle differences, based on
facts of each case, the Utah Supreme Court has at least recognized that "abuse of
discretion" must rise to the level of "arbitrary and capricious" in order for the
Courts [in the case the Personnel Review Board] to reverse and overturn a
decision of agency management. In Central Bank & Trust Company v. Brimhall, 28
Utah 2d 14, 497 P.2d 638 (Utah 1972) the court stated:
...the well-established rule is that the courts indulge him
[administrator] considerable latitude in determinations he
makes on questions of fact and also in the exercise of
his discretion with respect to the responsibilities which
the law imposes upon him; and they will not interfere
therewith unless it appears that he acted in excess of his
powers, or that he so abused his discretion that his
action was capricious or arbitrary. (Emphasis added)
The Michigan Appeals Court in People v. Wolschon, 2 Mich.App. 186,
139 N.W.2d 123 (Mich.App. 1966) stated:
The term discretion itself involves the idea
of choice, of our exercise of the will, or a
determination made between competing considerations. In order to have an "abuse" in
reaching such determination, the result must
be so palpably and grossly violative of fact
and logic that it evidences not the exercise
of will but perversity of will, not the
exercise of judgment but the defiance thereof, not the exercise of reason, but rather of
passion or bias. (Emphasis added)
The Wyoming Supreme Court added a further clarification in Waldrop
v. Weaver, 702 P.2d 1291 (Wyo. 1985) wherein the court said: "an abuse of
discretion is that which shocks the conscience of the Court and appears so unfair
and inequitable that a reasonable person could not abide it." (Emphasis added)
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This position was also accepted by the Louisiana Appellate Court in Schueler v.
Schueler, 460 So.2d 1120 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1984)
Is the termination of a peace officer for doing what Sucher did "so
palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic" or such that a "reasonable person"
would not agree? The Department says no!
As already quoted from the leading Utah case on termination of police
officers, Matter of Discharge of Jones, 720 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1986):
The sheriff must manage and direct his deputies, and is
in the best position to know whether their actions merit
discipline. If the Merit Commission [hearing officer and
Board] finds upon review that the facts support the
charges against the deputy, then it must affirm the
sheriff's disciplinary action, unless it finds the sanction so
clearly disproportionate to the charges as to amount to
an abuse of the sheriff's discretion. (Emphasis added)
The Utah Supreme Court has therefore held that in overturning an
agency's decision where discretion is exercised [such is certainly the case where
the department head has to weigh the factors regarding a peace officer's actions
and determine what penalty to impose], discretion must be abused and that to the
point where such abuse is arbitrary or capricious, in essence, not based on any
reason or fact and clearly erroneous. In essence, "Discretion is not abused unless,
under the circumstances being considered, the agency exceeds the bounds of
reason." Raimirez v. Civil Service Commission, 594 P.2d 1067 (Colo.App. 1979).
B
THE BOARD'S MISUSE OF
THE STANDARD LED TO ERROR
IN ITS OVERTURNING OF THE
AGENCY'S DECISION.
The Personnel Review Board clearly and explicitly stated in Finding
B.4: "The evidentiary examiner's conclusion and ruling was neither arbitrary nor
capricious..." (PRB Decision, p.15). Hence, according to Jones, supra, and Central,
supra, discretion could not have been abused, because there was a reasonable
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basis upon which to impose the discipline. The Board was therefore in error to
impose its judgment and overturn an otherwise valid and appropriate penalty.
As alluded to in earlier argument, the Board relied on the phrase
"excessive...in light of the totality of the facts and circumstances..." (Board
Decision, P.15). Excessive is not defined by the Board or the Board's rules.
Counsel has also not been able to find that as a standard used by the courts in
determining whether punishment, such as termination, should be imposed.
The Department maintains that in order for the Board to overturn the
penalty imposed by management, it would have to rule, as a matter of law, that the
punishment is so disproportionate to the offense, so unsupported by credible
evidence, that reasonable minds could not differ in holding that the punishment
was too extreme or "shocks one's sense of fairness." If the Board and this court
cannot make such a finding, the penalty must be sustained.
Simply because the Board feels the punishment is excessive, absent
a clear abuse of discretion, does not give the Board a right to substitute its own
penalty. The hearing officer did not find it so disproportionate, and in fact dealt
with the AIDS issue as well. There was simply inadequate "nexus" between "some
training" that could have been given and "excessive force" and "retaliatory" actions
to hold that somehow an otherwise appropriate discipline be overturned.
Counsel points out to the Court that the Board imposed a demotion
and an approximate 15 month suspension without pay, benefits or seniority as "its"
penalty. As will be discussed in later argument Rule R20-11-1.(4) of the
Personnel Management Rules, limits a suspension to no more than 30 calendar
days. Anything more serious would be grounds for termination, depending on the
"discretion" of management. The actions of Sucher that would justify a 1 % year
suspension is, in the opinion of Counsel, no different than what it would take to
justify a termination. Simply stated, the Board wanted to "send a message."

£
COURTS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY
HAVE HELD LIKE FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES
JUSTIFY TERMINATION. THUS, IT
CANNOT BE SAID THAT THE DEPARTMENT'S
ACTIONS SHOCK FAIRNESS OR ARE AN
ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
Courts throughout the country have held that terminating a police
officer [it must be remembered that Sucher is in this category] for using excessive
force or for striking a "shackled" or "handcuffed" prisoner is proper. With this
being the case, the Board inappropriately looked at the AIDS issue [an issue it
admitted had little effect, if any, on Sucher's reaction] in determining that the
penalty was not justified. As recited earlier, the Board held that Sucher (1)
retaliated, not because of the AIDS issue, but because the prisoner "spit" in his
face, (2) used excessive force which had nothing to do with the AIDS issue simply a matter of using unjustified and harsh force in a situation that justified no
force at all, and (3) any claim for self defense was groundless - in essence Sucher
was not defending himself against AIDS, but was simply getting even with
someone who spit on him.
AIDS training is irrelevant as it relates to the findings of Sucher's
inappropriate behavior. First of all, the use of excessive force cannot be tolerated
at any time, regardless of what the circumstances. This issue is totally
independent from AIDS training.
These grounds, in and of themselves justify disciplinary action,
including termination. The potential civil rights liability to the State and the
institution in addition to the issue of control and discipline among the staff dictates
that firm action be taken by management. It was and it is justified.
Second, the hitting of a fully restrained prisoner is independent
justification for termination, especially since the Board and its hearing officer both
found that the attack was retaliation and excessive.
01 _

An Illinois Appellate Court in Klein v. Board of Fire and Police
Commissioners of the City of Pana, 23 lll.App.3d 201, 318 N.E.2d 727 (III.App.
1974) addressed this issue:
The principles governing a review of a police officer's
dismissal have been well established in Illinois. Though
cause has not been defined by statute it has been
construed to mean some substantial shortcoming which
renders an employee's continuance in office in some way
detrimental to the discipline and efficiency of the service,
and which law and sound public opinion recognizes a
good cause for his no longer holding the position...We
understand the provoking nature of obscene name
calling. However, we also believe that an experienced,
competent police officer should have sufficient stature to
control himself and resist the temptation to resort to
physical violence, particularly with reference to a nineteen
year old boy neither posing nor offering any physical
threat. The many able reputable and hard working men
and women who wear the badge of a police officer
should not have to be categorized and judged by the
improper and ruthless acts of one so obsessed with the
power and authority of his office. (Emphasis added)
Certainly, Mr. Sucher was an experienced officer, a supervisor that
should have known better. The act of spitting, while offensive, was not physically
harmful, but basically an act of defiance on the part of the prisoner. When the act
of retaliation was committed, the prisoner was totally shackled and handcuffed and
was held by four other officers of the prison - the prisoner was totally restrained
and neither posed nor offered any threat to Sucher. This is, as the Illinois court
stated "improper and ruthless" and without just cause.
The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals in Lowery v. City of Mobile Police
Department, 448 So.2d 388 (Ala.Civ.App. 1984) sustained the termination of a six
foot six inch, 300 pound police officer (no threat to this officer) who struck an
unrestrained prisoner who had become argumentative and grabbed a metal screen
in the booking area. The Court held that since the superiors testified that such
force was "unnecessary and a breach of police department policy" the termination
was proper.

r\r\

In Johnson v. Civil Service Commission of Clinton, 352 N.W.2d 252
(Iowa 1984), the Iowa Supreme Court sustained the dismissal of a police officer
who struck a man at least twice while the victim was on the ground and on his
stomach. At the time of the blows, both officers had the man "pinned down." The
Court stated:
...This case is difficult because the charge of misconduct
is Johnson's first offense. Nonetheless, the nature of the
offense is abhorrent when viewed from the perspective
that an officer is supposed to protect citizens rather than
injure them. Moreover, while it is distasteful to remove a
police officer, protection of the public and furthering the
general good must be our paramount concern...
...We, as did the chief, the mayor, the Commission, and
the trial court, determine there was no justification for at
least two of the blows Johnson inflicted upon Susie. An
unjustified assault by a police officer cannot be tolerated.
(Emphasis added)
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania in Civil Service
Commission of the City of Philadelphia v. Wojtusik, 525 A.2d 1255 (Pa.CmwIth.
1987) reinstated the termination of an officer who was "off duty" but who had
assaulted an arresting officer. In upholding the decision to terminate the officer,
the court stated that 'The conduct of law enforcement officers must be 'above and
beyond reproach.'"
In two similar cases to the instant case the hitting of handcuffed
persons by police officers was considered sufficient grounds for termination. Such
discipline did not "abuse discretion." The first is In re Appeal of Herrington, 458
A.2d 320 (Pa.CmwIth. 1983) wherein the appellant had kneed and kicked a man
who was handcuffed. Herrington argued that the penalty was too severe [as
opposed to the Board stating that Sucher's punishment was excessive] for the
offense of assaulting a handcuffed person. The court said: "Suffice it to say that
we do not believe that the Commission abused its discretion in affirming
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Appellant's dismissal in light of the serious nature of Appellant's misconduct." The
second case is Appeal of Tuch, 159 N.J.Super. 219, 387 A.2d 1199 (S.Ct N.J.
1978) where the termination of a police officer who was found guilty of simple
assault, striking a prisoner while the prisoner was handcuffed, was sustained
These cases certainly show that courts have found that termination is
not only reasonable, but is proper for situations similar to those of Sucher In
addition, however, other courts have found that simply using "excessive force" is
also a ground for termination.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals in Bush v. City of St Joseph, 395
N.W.2d 466 (Minn.App. 1986) dealt with an issue where an officer pulled hair,
grabbed an individual by the neck and used "excessive and unjustifiable force
under the circumstances." In sustaining the termination the court stated "The use
of excessive and unjustified force while detaining these two juveniles reflects on
the qualifications of the officer in performing his duties and directly affects the
rights and interests of the public." See also Linton v. Bossier City Municipal Fire
and Police Civil Service Board, 428 So.2d 515 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1983)
The Utah Supreme Court has even gone so far as sustaining the
termination of a deputy sheriff who argued with attorneys at a deposition.
Hutchison v. Cartwright, 692 P.2d 772 (Utah 1984).
In light of each of the above referenced and cited cases, as well as
others that could be cited, it is clear that courts, including the Utah Supreme
Court, have found such action on the part of individuals such as Mr. Sucher,
justifiable grounds for termination and not "arbitrary," "capricious," "excessive," or
an "abuse of discretion." As a matter of law, the Departments termination of
Sucher is proper. The department head so found and the hearing officer [whose
findings of fact and conclusions of law were all accepted by the Board except the
penalty] so found. The Board, sitting in an appellate position cannot, as a matter of

law, hold from the evidence and cases that termination in this instance was an
"abuse of discretion," would "shock one's sense of fairness," is so "palpably and
grossly violative of fact and logic" or devoid of any "reasonable basis." The exact
same penalty has been imposed many times by other jurisdictions for similar
instances and has been found to be reasonable.
Based on the foregoing analysis and discussion, it is clear that the
Board, not the agency, abused its discretion, and overturned an otherwise proper
penalty for the grievous acts of Mr. Sucher. It cannot be said, as a matter of law,
that the action of the department head was so egregious or such an "abuse of
discretion" that the penalty must be overturned and something else imposed. As
such, the Board's actions in doing so are error and must be reversed.
POINT ill
THE PERSONNEL REVIEW BOARD ACTED
BEYOND ITS GRANT OF AUTHORITY BY
IMPOSING ITS OWN PENALTY
The Board overturned the decision of the Department of Corrections
Executive Director and imposed a penalty that is not sustainable under the
statutes of Utah or the Rules promulgated to implement discipline. As such, the
Board abused its discretion, acted beyond its scope of authority, and creates a
dangerous precedent which must not stand as the role of the Board. This is clearly
error and requires the board's actions be overturned.
The leading Utah case on point is Vetterli v. Civil Service Commission
of Salt Lake City, 145 P.2d 792 (Utah 1944). This involved a case where the Civil
Service Commission overturned a termination and imposed a penalty of
suspension greater than what the department head was authorized to impose. The
Commission claimed that it had the ability to impose its own penalty based on
statutory provisions which provided that the Commission "shall fully hear and
determine the matter/'
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The court phrased the key issue as follows: "...if the commission may
order a suspension from office as a substitute for discharge, on an appeal it may
do that which the removing officer in the first instance could not lawfully have
done, if the suspension is for more than 15 days [the maximum that could be
imposed by a department head]/' A resolution to this issue turned on what the
legislative intent through statutory enactment provided.
In analyzing the statutory provisions and its conclusion, the court said:
We do not find in our statute any phrase which grants
the same jurisdiction on appeal as is conferred where the
power on appeal is to "affirm, modify, or reverse," - an
expression usually if not universally employed where
such authority is actually conferred. The substitution of
suspension for 6 months without pay, in lieu of dismissal
was bevond the power of the commission." (Emphasis
added).
Point I of this brief clearly establishes an "appellate" role of the Board
and its hearing officers. No statutory authority of the type viewed necessary by the
court in Vetterii appears. U.C.A. §67-19-20(5)(a) simply establishes the Board as a
"quasi-judicial body to hear appeals from employees..." Appeals to the Board can
only be taken on the grounds found in U.C.A. §67-19-25(6)(a) where it is alleged
that the decision of the hearing officer was based on "incorrect or arbitrary
interpretation of facts" (the Board sustained all facts as found by the hearing
officer) "or that a matter of law is in dispute" (there was no such matter in
dispute - the Hearing Officer found in total favor of the Department and the Board
simply "substituted" its own penalty).
No provision provides the Board with the power to "rehear" a matter
and render a decision as if it were the department head. Yet that is not only what
was done here. It looked beyond whether there was "substantial evidence" to
sustain the action of the department head and imposed both a 15 month
suspension without pay [the Board called it administrative leave without pay] - 2V*
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times greater than what was overturned in Vetterii case and 15 times greater than
what a department head is authorized to impose. In addition the Board also
imposed a demotion.
The Board has no authority to impose what it did and is limited by the
Personnel Management Rules just as department heads. R20-11 of the Personnel
Management Rules governs discipline. R20-11-1.(4) lists the penalties which may
be imposed for discipline. They include one or more of the following:
(4)(a)

Written reprimand

(4)(b)

Suspension of the employee without pay up to
thirty calendar days per occurrence requiring
discipline.

(4)(c)

Demotion of the employee utilizing one of the
following methods as provided by law...

(4)(d)

A department head shall dismiss or demote an
employee only in accordance with the
provisions of 67-19-18(3)... (Emphasis added)

Dismissals and demotions are dealt with in Rule R20-11-2 of the
Personnel Management Rules. This section essentially tracks §67-19-18(1) as
referred to in prior argument. There it is clear that the department head is the
proper party to impose the penalty which then is what is "reviewed" on appeal.
The above penalties constitute the only authorized penalties which
may be imposed under Rules and law. The punishment fashioned by the Personnel
Review Board was not a written reprimand or termination of Mr. Sucher. It
demoted him from Grade 23 to Grade 21 and reduced his pay by 10 per cent and
suspended him 15 months without pay.
This action assumes that the Board in its "wisdom" knows the
workings of a department better than the department head since demotion of
require change of duties and responsibilities and neither the suspension nor
demotion were part of the originally imposed discipline. The Board is certainly not

-27-

in a position to make that kind of administrative decision and, as far as can be
adduced from the transcript and exhibits, there was no evidence taken to justify
the arbitrary decision of the Board to impose a demotion on management. In
essence the Board is saying "We know better what to do with the operations of
the department than the department administrator - find a place for this demoted
employee." This is error!
"Administrative leave without pay" is simply a glorified term for
"suspension." Such is not an authorized penalty. Nowhere is the Board granted
power to create penalties. Any reasonable doubt regarding the existence of its
power to create penalties must be resolved against it. Williams v. Public Service
Commission, 754 P.2d 41 (Utah 1988). The Board must apply only those penalties
which are authorized by statute or rules governing agencies.
While Rule R665-1~26.15.14 adopted by the Board does state that
the Board may "affirm, reverse, adopt, modify, supplement, amend or reject the
Hearing Officer's step 5 decision, either in whole or in part...or may make any other
appropriate disposition of the appeal," it goes too far in purportedly granting the
Board "carte blanche" authority to step into the shoes of the department head and
"do what the Board pleases." No statutory provision permits such a "substantive"
rule of the Board. This attempt is beyond the authority of the Board.
Obviously the Board has invoked this provision in this case. No
statute gives the Board such authority and the Board cannot create an "all
powerful" scope of review by rule. As has been seen in this case, that "open
ended" authority that the Board has given itself has created "new penalties," has
"placed it in the role of the department head" and has been an "abuse" of its
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power. The numerous court cases cited establish clearly that this is improper and
that the Board has gone "too far."
Counsel does not contest the fact that the Board may modify the
hearing officer's decision if it finds that the hearing officer did not apply the proper
role of review for the department head's decision, or that there was/was not
substantial evidence to sustain the department head. It does not, however, have
any authority or right to "invent" a new role for itself without clear statutory
language - which does not exist here!
As was stated by the Supreme court of South Dakota in Drovdalo v.
Department of Public Safety, 255 N.W.2d 437 (S.D. 1977), after citing Vetterli:
There is nothing in this statute which gives the
commission any discretion regarding the disciplinary
action to be taken. On the contrary, SDCL 3-7-15
specifically provides for the removal, discharge, or
reduction by the appointing officer. The function of the
commission under SDCL 3-7-17 is merely to determine
whether or not the removal, discharge, or reduction was
made for good cause...
In this case, the courts reversed the Police Civil Service Commission
that had overturned a determination by the department head and imposed its own
penalty which was a "lesser" penalty.
The Board stated in its Decision and Order that: "The period of
absence from September 14, 1987 through January 7, 1989 shall be treated as an
administrative leave without pay, during which no seniority accrues, nor does that
time count toward the annual leave and sick leave accrual rates." (PRB Decision
p.17). The only use of administrative leave for such circumstances is found in
R20-11-1.(2). This rule gives the agency head two options during the pendency of
an investigation. The employee may be placed on paid [as opposed to unpaid]
administrative leave for up to thirty working days, or more if the director of the
Department of Human Resource Management approves. Such assignment,
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however, does not take away seniority, benefits, leave accrual, etc, nor is there
any such authorization for usage of administrative leave [either paid or unpaid] for
a "final penalty."
The only other possibility for the use of such leave is found in U.C.A.
§67-19-18(2) which allows a "suspension" without pay pending dismissals
procedures taking place if the retention of the employee poses a grave threat to
health safety or to the public interest. It is a "suspension" not "administrative leave
without pay." This the Board created.
The Board's action, whether seen as a suspension pending an
investigation under R20-11-1.(2) or as a suspension pending appeal under §6719-18(2), requires a finding of at least one of the factors listed, i.e. grave threat to
the public interest, etc. By imposing the penalty as enunciated, the Board must
have implicitly found that Sucher's conduct was aggravated to this extent.
In essence, the Board told Mr. Sucher he was fired and then
instructed the Department to "rehire" him some 15 months later and in a demoted
state. This it clearly cannot do. Appellant asserts the Board has no inherent power
and can assert only those powers expressly granted or clearly implied as
necessary to its duties and responsibilities. (See Williams, supra).
Under U.C.A. §67-19-18(1): "The director [Department of Human
Resource Management - formerly Division of Personnel Management] shall
promulgate rules governing the procedural and documentary requirements of
disciplinary dismissals and demotions." On the other hand, U.C.A. §67-19-20,
which established the Personnel Review Board, sets no standards for review. §6719-21, dealing with matters which may be submitted on appeal, is similarly silent
as to the Board's rights in this area.
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Thus, DHRM and not the Board controls this area. For the Board to
usurp authority and impose both a 15 month suspension and a demotion does
violence to the clear roles set for it and the department head by statute.
Counsel asks the question: "How much cause must be shown to
justify a termination when findings of 'retaliation,' 'excessive force,' and unjustified
claims of self defense were the determinations of the Board?" The Board has
established a standard that is both unrealistic and unworkable. In order to even
sustain a 15 month suspension and demotion, the Department had to prove a
substantial offense - it did. Yet the Board is saying: THAT IS NOT ENOUGH!
All U.C.A. §67-19-18(1) requires is that "just cause" be shown. The
Board, in holding that sufficient evidence and grounds existed to do what it did, is
also sustaining "just cause" to sustain a termination.
It seems wholly appropriate to limit agencies in the number of
days/months suspensions can be imposed. If suspensions could be imposed up to
15 months - or even two or three years by department heads, great abuses could
exist and suspensions could be used as tools of "oppression" instead of discipline.
Such is not in keeping with merit principles. If someone's actions are serious
enough to merit a 15 months suspension and demotion, they are certainly serious
enough for dismissal.
Simply because it is the Board that is imposing a lesser penalty than
termination (even though management could not have done what the Board did)
does not make the action right or justified.
Neither the Board nor the Court can substitute its own judgment for
that of the department head. The Board definitely felt that more than a 30 day
suspension was justified (the maximum management can impose is 30 days). Such
was error. This court likewise must not make the same error by sustaining
something not even management can do. This includes trimming the suspension to
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30 days with reinstatement. Neither the Department, the Hearing Officer nor the
Board has done that. The only appropriate relief, based on the Board's "abuse of
discretion" and acting ''beyond its authority" is to reverse the Board and reinstate
the termination. To do otherwise would make the court a party to the inappropriate
actions of the Board.
POINT IV
THE PERSONNEL REVIEW BOARD IMPROPERLY
AND PREJUDICIALLY RELIED ON THE ISSUE
OF AIDS TRAINING AS A GROUND TO IMPOSE
ITS OWN PENALTY - SUCH IS REVERSIBLE ERROR
Appellant submits that, as a matter of law, the issue of AIDS training
is irrelevant. The Board agreed that Sucher's belief was subjective. It was not only
subjective, but erroneous (PRB Decision, p. 14). As noted in Thomas v. Atascadero
Unified School District, 662 F.Supp. 376 (C.D.Cal. 1987) the best available medical
evidence shows that AIDS is not spread by anything other than "[i]nfected blood,
semen, or vaginal fluids (and, possibly, mother's milk)." The court concluded: 'The
overwhelming weight of medical evidence is that the AIDS virus is not transmitted
by human bites, even bites that break the skin."
As noted in United States v. Moore, 846 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir. 1988):
The evidence established that there are no well proven
cases of AIDS transmission by way of bite; that contact
with saliva has never been shown to transmit the
disease: and that in one case a person who had been
deeply bitten by a person with AIDS tested negative
several months later. Indeed, a recent study has
indicated that saliva actually may contain substances that
protect the body from AIDS. New York Times, May 6,
1988, at A 16, col. 4. (Emphasis added)
The Board in this case found that Sucher's use of force was "not
appropriate or reasonable, but his act of punching Loya constituted excessive
force." (PRB Decision, p. 14) The only way to come to that conclusion is to
compare Sucher's conduct to a standard. That standard is the training he received.
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He had been taught that striking an inmate under the circumstances
of June 19, 1987 was inappropriate, unreasonable and excessive. Sucher had
received this training! Kevin Gray testified at the Step 5 hearing that he had taught
a class on the abuse of force in February of 1986 (2:46). That class was attended
by Mr. Sucher (2:47). Mr. Gray was accepted as an expert (2:53). Mr. Gary was
asked a hypothetical question about an inmate who was handcuffed, wearing leg
irons and being carried who then spit at someone. Gray stated that restraint would
be as high on the continuum of force that would be acceptable. Anything more
than that would be abusive (2:54).
At the conclusion of Mr. Gray's direct testimony, Mr. Sucher indicated
he wished to cross examine. The Hearing Officer stated, "Go ahead. Ask him what
you want but I think it's clear that you have a training program, probably very
good, and Mr. Sucher attended one class anyway. I don't know that additional
information is needed" (2:60). Appellant submits that the instruction given Mr.
Sucher put him on notice that striking a fully restrained inmate who spit on him
was excessive, regardless of the reason! This is so even if AIDS was not
specifically addressed in the training.
Counsel points out that Sucher hit Loya after he was spit upon.
Training (whether one has AIDS or not) would center on how one deals with the
"post spit' situation. Once saliva is on the skin, hitting a fully shackled prisoner will
have no effect on what the saliva will do to the party being spit upon. Hence, a
clear finding of "retaliation" and "excessive force" with no "self defense" being
credible. The training necessary to deal with the situation was given. Sucher had
no justification (including the weak excuse of no AIDS training) for what he did.
This case is analogous to code of conduct cases. The concept of
"conduct unbecoming" has been challenged numerous times on vagueness
grounds, both in the law enforcement field as well as areas of professional

conduct for licensed professionals. In the overwhelming number of cases, the
courts have rejected such challenges on the grounds that it is impossible to write
a specific regulation for every possible type of conduct which would be
"unbecoming". Similarly, it is impossible to train someone on the appropriate
amount of force for every imagineable situation. However, the facts and
conclusions of this case make it clear that the AIDS issue was irrelevant to the
excessive and improper acts of Sucher.
The hearing officer added that even if Sucher had not received
specific training on this type of situation, as a certified peace officer he knew or
should have known he would be subjected to abuse, including being spit on, and
that striking an inmate was a last resort, short of deadly force. (Step 5 Decision, p.
9-10). Even the average citizen knows that a peace officer is entitled to use force,
but that retaliation is not permitted and is grounds for suit.
The hearing officer concluded that the lack of specific training on
AIDS was not a sound basis for modifying the Department's decision to terminate
Sucher. In discussing this issue he stated: "No evidence was produced to the
effect that AIDS can be transmitted through saliva or spit or that AIDS is such a
problem at the Prison that Sucher and other prison personnel were inadequately
trained with respect to it." (Step 5 Decision, p. 11, Emphasis added). In other
words, Sucher's training was found to be adequate as it relates to his use of force
in this case. His subjective fear of AIDS makes no difference.
The Board concluded, as a matter of law (since it came up with no
facts that would justify reversal of the hearing officer's decision on this point) that
it did make a difference. It stated: "[t] Board makes a different ultimate legal
conclusion than did the hearing officer." (PRB Decision, p. 16) The Board's
conclusion is flawed. The Board's second finding of fact states:

-34-

Sucher did not receive appropriate training or adequate
notice of how to properly respond to a situation in which
an inmate — a potential AIDS-infected person or a
suspected carrier with the condition of AIDS Related
Complex, which is also referred to as ARC and PreAIDS — threatens to spit or otherwise transmit his saliva
to the exposed skin of correctional staff. (PRB Decision,
p. 13)
The Board held, in effect, as a matter of law, that all inmates
presumed to be AIDS carriers. There is no sound basis for this conclusion. The
Hearing Officer's finding, which was based on substantial evidence, was that AIDS
was not that type of problem at the prison. Unless the overwhelming weight of the
evidence is to the contrary, the Board has no authority to reverse the finding of the
Hearing Officer. Ray v. Consolidated Freightways, 289 P.2d 196, 4 Ut. 137 (1955).
The Board cites nothing in the record in support of its conclusion. Indeed, the
record will not support such a conclusion. Sucher admitted he had no information
that Inmate Loya used intravenous drugs or had engaged in homosexual activity.
He simply felt because such activities existed in the facility that Loya might have
engaged in them. (4:36) He admitted at the time of the incident he did not know if
Loya had AIDS. (4:37) He testified there was only one inmate housed in the same
building known to carry the AIDS virus. (3:133) This Court must overturn the
Board's unsupported conclusion. Stegen v. Department of Employment Security,
751 P.2d 1160 (Utah App. 1988).
In Department of Social Services v. Janice T., 524 N.Y.S.2d 267
(A.D.2 Dept. 1988) the court considered the propriety of issuing an order for an
AIDS test on a woman who had bitten a deputy sheriff. The woman was the
subject of a child neglect hearing in Family Court. The appellate court noted that
AIDS was unrelated to the pending neglect petition. It also found that the record
was devoid of any evidence that she had or was suspected of having AIDS. It
found that the Family Court abused its discretion in ordering the test.
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In the instant case, the record is devoid of substantial evidence that
Inmate Loya had or could be legitimately suspected of having AIDS. It was an
abuse of discretion for the Board to legitimize Sucher's "Gestalt" feeling (4:48) and
conclude, as a matter of law, that he should have been trained regarding AIDS.
This Court should apply the correction-of-error standard, granting no deference to
the Board's legal conclusion. Williams, supra, at p. 50. Deference should be
granted to the Department. Jones, supra.
Assuming, as the Board did, that the Department should have trained
Sucher regarding AIDS, they have again sent a mixed message. Even if AIDS
could be transmitted by the act of spitting, no peace officer is entitled to retaliate.
The Board found Sucher's striking inmate Loya to be retaliation, not to prevent
being spit on a second time. He would not have been entitled to strike Loya in
retaliation even if Loya had shot at him.
The Board found there were numerous alternative measures Sucher
could have used to avoid being spit on again. This is consistent with Sucher's
own statement that he had walked away in the past. It concluded, "Considered in
the total context of the Loya incident, Sucher's act of punching Loya in the mouth
was not the act that a reasonable person would take in the same situation. Thus,
Sucher's reliance upon a self defense claim is found to have been unreasonable,
without merit, and wholly inappropriate as a response." Decision and Order, p. 15.
This illustrates the inconsistency of the Board's reasoning. Training informs and
educates, it does not turn unreasonable people into reasonable people. The
Department should not be required to retain as a peace officer a person which the
Board has found responds unreasonably and retaliates with excessive force.
Sucher's conduct also shows the issue of AIDS training is irrelevant to
the issue at hand. He testified that at the time of the incident he was under the
impression that AIDS could be transmitted by any bodily fluid (3:135). He had been
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spit on in the past (4:43,52). He also testified that he harbored a fear of AIDS for
well over two years prior to the incident of June 19th (3:134). Yet he mingled with
prisoners a minimum of an hour and a half every day from June 19th to at least
August 17th of 1987 and had no problems or confrontations with them at all
(3:147-9). He had his fourth AIDS test on September 28, 1987. He stated that
the series of tests was to determine if there had been exposure, followed by three
tests to verify the accuracy of the first test (3:190). On the date he testified,
December 4, 1987, he said that he still feared the AIDS virus (4:49). He testified
he and his wife no longer slept together because of not knowing about whether or
not inmate Loya had AIDS (3:188-9). One must wonder why his two year old fear
suddenly changed after the Loya incident, but had no effect before.
Being spit on is something that one can expect when working in a
corrections setting. Mr. Sucher had been spit on in the past. He was asked if he
could have walked away after inmate Loya first spit on him. He answered, "In the
past I've been spit on in medium security by inmates and just looked at them, got
up, and stood up and walked over to the sally port and washed myself off" (4:43).
Later, when asked a similar question, he stated, "I don't know. I've done it in the
past" (4:52). Are we to believe that the reason he did not walk away on June 19th
was presumably because he feared Loya had AIDS? Yet by his own testimony,
the only basis he had for suspecting Inmate Loya had AIDS was a "Gestalt feeling"
(4:38). Appellant submits the reason he did not walk away, as he had in the past,
was not a fear of AIDS. Inmate Loya was handcuffed and shackled. He was
being held by at least three other corrections officers. It was because Sucher
could strike Loya for being spit upon without fear of Loya hitting back.
If Mr. Sucher truly had a fear of AIDS for two years prior to June 19,
1987, and believed it could be transmitted by any bodily fluid, one must wonder
why he continued to work in an environment where he had previously been spit on.

-37-

If he still possesses that belief, one must wonder why he would insist on going
back into such an environment. He argues that he should have received training,
asking this Court to conclude it would have made a difference in his conduct

He

was spit on before and walked away, even though he held his subjective fear of
AIDS for over two years prior to this incident

Clearly, training would have made

no difference
If anyone would be motivated to seek out the medical evidence
accepted in Thomas and Moore, supra, it would be someone with the belief Mr
Sucher claims to have. Indeed, the information he did have prior to the incident
told him saliva was not recognized as a means of transmitting the disease
could have followed up on that information

He

Yet on December 4, 1987, after four

AIDS test, he maintained he still possessed the belief and fear. If he did possess
the fear at the time he struck inmate Loya, he should not now

Appellant submits

that training would do little to disabuse him of his mistaken belief in light of
Sucher's insistence that his fear remains.
At best, Sucher has a fear that motivated him to strike someone who
spit on him. Still clinging to that fear he asks this Court to return him to the same
environment where he may be spit on again. At worst, he is hiding behind a fear
he does not possess in an attempt to rationalize behavior found to be
unreasonable and wholly inappropriate. His conduct is not consistent with his
arguments. The Court should rely on his conduct and reinstate the decision of the
Hearing Officer and the department head.
CONCLUSION
Each of the foregoing arguments individually justify the Courts
reinstatement of the dismissal. Taken as a whole, it is overwhelmingly clear that
the Board abused its discretion and committed reversible error in substituting its
judgment when no appropriate ground to do so exists.
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This Court should apply the correction of error standard found in Utah
Department of Administrative Services v. Public Service Commission, 658 P.2d
601 (Utah 1983) and correct the error created by the Board and reinstate the
termination of Mr. Sucher.
DATED this

H

day of April, 1989.

~STEPHEN13. SCHWENDIMAN
Assistant Attorney General
Chief, Tax & Business
Regulation Division
Attorney for Appellant
Department of Corrections
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day of April, 1989, to
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50 West 300 South #900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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-40-

ADDENDUM

Utah Code Annotated 67-19-18 through 25, 1953 as Amended
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Utah Personnel Review Board Rules, R665-1-25 and 26
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Law Enforcement Code of Ethics, Adoped August 6, 1968 by the Utah Council on
Peace Officer Standards and Training
Testimony of Kevin Gray relating to training given to Paul Sucher
Paul S. Sucher v. Department of Corrections, 6 PRB/H.O 88 [Hearing Officer's
decision] issued January 8, 1988
Paul S. Sucher v. Utah State Prison, 3 PRB 27 [Personnel Review Board decision]
issued December 19, 1988.

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 67-19-18 THROUGH 25
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67-19-16. Appointments to schedule B positions
— Examinations — Certification on appropriate registers — Probationary
service — Dismissal — Tenure.
(1) Appointments to positions under schedule B
shall be made from registers of applicants who have
been selected by competitive procedures as defined by
the director
(2) Vacancy notices for career service positions
shall be publicly announced for penods of time to be
determined by the director, but in every case a minimum of five days, and in a manner designed to attract an optimum number of qualified applicants
(3) The director shall validate the examining instruments, consulting with agency officials and outside experts toward this end
(4) When a department requests certification of applicants who have passed the tests, the director shall
certify applicants on appropnate registers defined by
rules promulgated by the director
(5) Appointments to fill vacancies shall be made by
the agency head from appropriate registers for probationary periods to be defined by rules and regulations
promulgated by the director A person serving a probationary period may be dismissed at any time by the
appointing officer without hearing or appeal, unless
discrimination is alleged Tenure shall be granted career service employees upon the successful completion of the probationary period
1983

67-19-17. Reappointment of employees not retained in exempt position.
Any career service employee accepting an appointment to an exempt position who is not retained by the
appointing officer, unless discharged for cause as provided by this act or by regulation, shall
(1) be appointed to any career service position
for which the employee qualifies in a pay grade
comparable to the employee's last position in the
career service provided an opening exists, or
(2) be appointed to any lesser career service
position for which the employee qualifies pending the opening of a position described in Subsection (1) of this section The director shall maintain a reappointment register for this purpose
and it shall have precedence over other registers
1979

67-19-18. Dismissals and demotions — Grounds
— Disciplinary action — Procedure —
Reductions in force.
(1) Dismissals or demotions of career service employees shall only be to advance the good of the public
interest, and for such just causes as inefficiency, incompetency, failure to maintain skills or adequate
performance levels, insubordination, disloyalty to the
orders of a superior, misfeasance, malfeasance, or
nonfeasance in office There shall be no dismissal for
reasons of race, sex, age, physical handicap, national
origin, religion, political affiliation, or other nonmerit factor including the exercise of rights under
this chapter The director shall promulgate rules governing the procedural and documentary requirements
of disciplinary dismissals and demotions
(2) If an agency head finds that a career service
employee is charged with aggravated misconduct or
that retention of a career service employee would endanger the peace and safety of others or pose a grave
threat to the public interest, the employee may be
suspended pending the administrative appeal to the
department head as provided in Subsection (3)
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(3) No person shall be demoted or dismissed from a
career service position unless the department head or
designated representative has observed the following
procedures
(a) The department head or designated representative notifies the employee in writing of the
reasons for the dismissal or demotion,
(b) The employee has no less than five working
days to reply and have the reply considered by
the department head,
(c) The employee has an opportunity to be
heard by the department head or designated representative, and
(d) Following the hearing an employee may be
dismissed or demoted if the department head
finds adequate cause or reason
(4) Reductions in force required by inadequate
funds, change of workload, or lack of work shall be
governed by retention rosters established by the director Under such circumstances
(a) The agency head shall designate the category of work to be eliminated, subject to review
by the director,
(b) Temporary and probationary workers shall
be separated before any tenured employee,
(c) Retention points for each tenured employee
shall be computed according to rules promulgated by the director allowing appropnate consideration for proficiency and for seniority in
state government, including any active duty military service fulfilled subsequent to original state
appointment Tenured employees shall be separated in the order of their retention points, the
employee with the lowest points to be discharged
first, and
(d) A career service employee who is separated
in a reduction in force shall be placed on the reappointment roster provided for in Subsection
67-19-17(2), and shall be reappointed without examination to any vacancy for which the employee
is qualified which occurs within one year of the
date of the separation
(e) An employee separated due to a reduction
in force may appeal to the department head for
an administrative review The notice of appeal
must be submitted within 20 working days after
the employee's receipt of written notification of
separation The employee may appeal the decision of the department head according to the
grievance and appeals procedure of this act 1963
67-19-19. Political activity of employees —
Rules and regulations — Highway patrol — Hatch Act
Except as otherwise provided by law or by rules
promulgated under this section for federally aided
programs, the following provisions apply with regard
to political activity of career service employees in all
grades and positions
(1) State career service employees may voluntarily participate in political activity subject to
the following provisions
(a) if any state career service employee is
elected to any partisan or full-time nonpartisan political office, that employee shall be
granted a leave of absence without pay for
times when monetary compensation is received for service in political office,
(b) no officer or employee in career service
may engage in any political activity during
the hours of employment, nor may any person solicit political contributions from em-
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ployees of the executive branch during hours
of employment for political purposes, and
(c) partisan political activity may not be a
basis for employment, promotion, demotion,
or dismissal, except that the director shall
adopt rules providing for the discipline or
punishment of a state officer or employee
who violates any provision of this section
(2) (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of
this section, no member of the Utah Highway Patrol may use his official authority or
influence for the purpose of interfering with
an election or affecting the results of an elec
tion
(b) No person may induce or attempt to
induce any member of the Utah Highway
Patrol to participate in any activity prohibited by this subsection
(3) Nothing contained in this section ma> be
construed to
(a) preclude voluntary contributions b> a
state employee to the part} or candidate of
the officer's or employee's choice, or
(b) permit partisan political activity b>
any state employee who is prevented or re
stncted from engaging in the political activity by the provisions of the federal Hatch
Act
1988

67-19-20. Personnel Re vie* Board created —
Members — Appointment — Terms —
Organization — Removal — Compensation — Powers and duties — Hearing
officers — Executive secretary —
Hearings — Appeals — Employees.
(1) There shall be a Personnel Review Board of five
members, appointed by the governor for four-year
terms, three with terms coterminous with the governor's and two with terms beginning January 1 of the
third year of the governor's regular term in office
The members of the existing five member merit sys
tern council shall complete the terms for which they
are appointed and subsequent appointments shall be
made in a manner to be determined by the governor
to effect the rotation required by this subsection
(2) The Personnel Review Board shall be organized
as follows
(a) The members of the board shall be persons
in sympathy with the application of merit principles to public employment No member of the
board shall be a member of any local, state or
national committee of a political party or an officer or member of a committee in any partisan
political club, or shall hold, or be a candidate for,
any paid public office No more than three members of the board shall be from the same political
party,
(b) The governor shall annually designate one
of the board members to serve as chairman, and
any three board members may constitute a quorum for the performance of all duties and responsibilities hereinafter set forth and the actions of a
majority of those present at a hearing at which a
quorum is present shall be the actions of the
board
(3) The board members may be removed only for
cause
(4) Each board member shall receive a per diem for
official meetings attended and reimbursement for official travel expenses, as provided by law
(5) The duties and responsibilities of the Personnel
Review Board shall be
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(a) to serve as a quasi-judicial body to hear
appeals from employees directly affected by ac
tions taken under authority granted by this
chapter to the director or to agencies on matters
pertaining to promotions, dismissals, demotions,
wages, salary, classification, violations of personnel rules, benefits, reductions in force, and disciplinary actions,
(b) to serve as the final administrative appeal
bod> to hear grievances brought by career service
employees against agencies, as provided b> Sec
tion 67-19-21, which have not been resolved at an
earlier stage in the appeals process
(6) The Personnel Review Board shall appoint one
or more impartial hearing officers on a full-time or
part-time basis, who shall have demonstrated b> edu
cation and experience an ability to arbitrate and re
solve personnel administration disputes and to handle employee relations in a large work force
(7) (a) The Personnel Review Board shall emplo>
an executive secretary who shall have demonstrated an ability to administer personnel policies and ma> appoint clerical assistance as
needed The executive secretary shall have the
power to
d) subpoena witnesses, documents, or
other evidence in conjunction with any inquiry, investigation, hearing, or other pro
ceedmg and
(n) determine an employee's standing to
process his claim if he has been directly
harmed, and also which issues may be heard
The executive secretary may hold hearings,
allow oral and written argument, and give
parties an opportunity to be heard on these
issues and shall within 15 days after the
hearing issue a decision in writing The employee or the agency ma> appeal the executive secretary's decision to the district court
where the employee lives or the district court
of Salt Lake County within 20 days after receipt of the decision The notice of appeal
shall state the grounds upon which error is
claimed and the appeal shall be on the
record
(b) Employees of the Personnel Review Board
shall be exempt from the career service provisions of this chapter
(8) Any member of the Personnel Review Board
may administer oaths, certify official acts, and subpoena witnesses, documents, or other evidence in conjunction with any inquiry, investigation, hearing, or
other proceeding
1963
67-19-21.

Charges submissible u n d e r grievance

and appeals procedure.
(1) Any career service employee may submit a
grievance based upon a claim or charge of injustice or
oppression, including dismissal from employment, resulting from an act, occurrence, omission, or condition for solution through the grievance procedures set
forth in this chapter
(2) (a) An aggrieved employee may appeal promotions, dismissals, demotions, wages, salary, violation of personnel rules, issues concerning the equitable administration of benefits, reductions in
force, and disciplinary actions to the Personnel
Review Board and its hearing officers
(b) No other matters may be appealed to the
Personnel Review Board or its hearing officers
(3) An aggrieved employee may appeal a determination regarding position classification and position

653

STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES

schedule assignments to the executive secretary of
the Personnel Review Board
(4) (a) With the exception of those actions described in Subsections (2), (3), and (5), all other
matters may be appealed by an employee to his
department head
(b) The decision of the department head is
final
(5) (a) Any employee of the state, other than an
employee of a higher education institution, may
submit a charge of a prohibited practice as defined in Section 34-35-6 to his department head
(b) If an employee does not agree with the decision of the department head, he may file a complaint with the Utah Antidiscrimination Division
(c) If the department head has not issued a decision before the deadline for filing a complaint
with the division, the employee may file directly
with the commission and shall send a copy to the
department head
(d) The Personnel Review Board and its hearing officers have no jurisdiction to consider these
matters
1968
67-19-21.1. P r o c e d u r e s — A d j u d i c a t i v e p r o c e e d ings.
The Personnel Review Board shall comply with the
procedures and requirements of Chapter 46b, Title
63, in its adjudicative proceedings, except that the
procedural time limits established in Chapter 19, Title 67, supersede the procedural time limits of Chapter 46b, Title 63
1987
67-19-22.

E m p l o y e e s ' rights in g r i e v a n c e a n d
appeals procedure.
For the purpose of processing an appeal, an employee is entitled to
(1) assistance by a representative of the employee's choice to act as an advocate at any level
of the procedure,
(2) a reasonable amount of time during work
hours to confer with the representative and prepare the grievance,
(3) freedom from reprisals for use of the procedure, and
(4) call other employees as witnesses at an appeal hearing and such employees shall be allowed to attend and testify at the hearing if reasonable advance notice is given to the witnesses'
immediate supervisor
1S79

67-19-23.

Right of aggrieved employee to process appeal to next step — Waiver or
extension of appeal steps and time
limits — Waiver of right to appeal further.
(1) Failure to answer an employee's appeal within
the time specified automatically grants the aggrieved
employee the right to process the appeal to the next
step
(2) Any appeal step, or any time limits specified at
any step, may be waived or extended by mutual
agreement in writing between the aggrieved employee and the person to whom the appeal is directed
(3) Failure to process an appeal from one step to
the next step within the time specified is deemed a
waiver by the aggrieved employee of any nght to process the appeal further or to appeal to any court, the
appeal being deemed settled on the basis of the last
Step
1979

67-19-25

67-19-24. Time limits for submission of appeal
by aggrieved employee — Voluntary
termination of employment
(1) No appeal shall be submitted under this chapter unless (a) it is submitted within 20 working days
after the event giving rise to the appeal or (b) within
20 working days after the aggrieved employee has
knowledge of the event giving rise to the appeal
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1Kb), no employee may submit an appeal more than one year
after the event giving n s e to the appeal, nor does any
person who has voluntarily terminated his or her employment with the state have any standing thereafter
to submit an appeal
1979
67-19-25.

P r o c e d u r a l s t e p s t o b e f o l l o w e d b y aggrieved employee — Evidentiary and
procedural rules — Appeal to Personnel Review Board — Appeal to district
court
(1) An aggrieved employee appealing an administrative action may observe the procedural steps set
forth in this section only to the level permitted by
Section 67-19-21
(2) (a) An aggrieved employee shall first attempt
to resolve a grievance through discussion with
the employee's immediate supervisor
(b) If the grievance submitted under Subsection (1) remains unanswered for five working
days after submission, or if the aggrieved employee is dissatisfied with the decisions reached,
the employee may resubmit the appeal, in writing, to his immediate supervisor within five
working days after the expiration of the penod
for answer or receipt of the decision, whichever is
first
(c) The immediate supervisor shall render a
written decision under this step within five working days after submission of the appeal
(d) The employee shall, upon submission of the
appeal to the immediate supervisor, notify the
executive secretary of the Personnel Review
Board that the employee has initiated the appeal
(e) Upon receipt of the notification of appeal,
the executive secretary shall
d) attempt to settle the complaint by conference, conciliation, and persuasion,
(n) determine whether or not the employee has standing to process a claim,
(in) determine whether or not the employee has been directly harmed, and
(iv) determine which issues may be heard
(f) If the executive secretary finds that the
grievance is authorized under Subsection
67-19-21, it may be heard by the Personnel Review Board or its heanng officer
(g) If the executive secretary finds that the
grievance is one that the agency is unable to resolve, he may, either on his own motion or with
the concurrence of the employee and the agency,
waive the requirement for a decision by the immediate supervisor and under Subsections (3)
and (4), procedure and submit the grievance directly to the hearing officer under Subsection (5)
(h) He shall also attempt to resolve the dispute
by informal means with the appropriate parties
(3) (a) If the appeal submitted under Subsection
(2) remains unanswered for five working days
after submission, or if the aggrieved employee is
dissatisfied with the decision reached, the employee may submit the appeal, in writing, to his
second level supervisor within ten working days
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after the expiration of the period for decision or
receipt of the decision, whichever is first.
(b) The second level supervisor shall issue a
written decision under this step setting forth the
reasons for decision within five working days after submission of the appeal.
(4) (a) If the appeal submitted under Subsection
(3) remains unanswered for five working days
after submission, or if the aggrieved employee is
dissatisfied with the decision reached, the employee may submit the appeal in writing to his
department head within ten working days after
the expiration of the period for decision or receipt
of the decision, whichever is first.
(b) The department head shall issue a written
decision under this step setting forth the reasons
for the decision within ten working days after
submission of the appeal.
(c) The decision of the department head shall
be final in all matters except as provided in Section 67-19-21.
(5) (a) (i) If an appeal submitted under Subsection
(4) that may be appealed to the hearing officer, under Section 67-19-21, remains unanswered for ten working days after submission, or if the aggrieved employee is dissatisfied with the decision reached, the employee
may submit the appeal in writing to the executive secretary within ten working days
after the expiration of the period for decision
or receipt of the decision, whichever is first.
(ii) Written notice of the time and place
for hearing shall be given to the aggrieved
employee at least five days before the date
set for hearing.
(iii) The executive secretary shall set the
hearing not later than 15 days after submission of the grievance, or at a time agreed
upon by the parties and the executive secretary.
(b) In those matters involving classification or
position schedule assignment, the parties shall
follow the procedures of this Subsection (5)(b).
(i) Upon receipt of a notice of an appeal,
the executive secretary shall refer the appeal
to the director.
(ii) The director shall assign the appeal to
a classification panel of three or more impartial persons trained in state classification
procedures.
(iii) The classification panel may:
(A) obtain access to previous audits,
classification decisions, and reports;
(B) request new or additional audits
by department or agency personnel analysts; and
(C) consider new or additional information.
(iv) In making its determination, the classification panel shall determine whether or
not the classification assignment was appropriate, and shall follow the statutes, rules,
and procedures adopted by the division that
were in effect at the time of the classification
or schedule change.
(v) The panel may sustain or modify the
original decision or enter a new decision.
(vi) The panel shall report its decision and
findings to the director, who shall notify the
appellant.
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(vii) Either party may appeal the panel's
decision to a classification committee appointed by the director.
(viii) The director shall appoint a classification committee composed of three or more
department directors representing both
large and small agencies.
(ix) The classification committee shall review the classification and make the final
decision.
(c) (i) In all appeals to the hearing officer, a
certified court reporter shall report the proceedings, or a suitable electronic recording
device shall be used to record the proceeding.
(ii) The transcript of the proceedings, together with all exhibits received during the
hearing, is the record of the hearing.
(iii) The hearing officer may subpoena
witnesses and compel testimony in the conduct of the hearings.
(d) (i) The state has the burden of proof in all
appeals resulting from dismissals, demotions, suspensions, and other disciplinary actions.
(ii) The employee has the burden of proof
in all other appeals.
(e) The hearing officer shall issue his decision
in writing.
(f) In those appeals where the hearing officer
does not issue a decision within 20 working days,
the agency that is a party to the action is not
liable for any claimed back wages or benefits
from the expiration of the permitted time for issuing the decision to when the decision is issued.
(6) (a) If no decision is issued under Subsection (5)
within 20 working days after the hearing, or if
either the aggrieved employee or the agency is
dissatisfied with a decision on appeal from dismissal, or if the aggrieved employee, applicant,
or agency alleges that a decision of the hearing
officer was based on incorrect or arbitrary interpretation of facts or that a matter of law is in
dispute, the employee or agency may submit an
appeal in writing, together with a transcript of
the hearing conducted under Subsection (5), to
the Personnel Review Board within ten working
days after the expiration of the period of decision
or upon receipt of the decision, whichever is first.
(b) The board shall give written notice of the
time and place for hearing to the employee and
the agency at least five days before the date set
for the hearing.
(c) The board shall hold the hearing not later
than 30 days after submission of the transcript.
(d) The hearing before the Personnel Review
Board shall be based upon the record as established under Subsection (5).
(e) The Personnel Review Board shall issue its
written decision within 40 working days after the
hearing.
(f) If the board does not issue its written decision within 40 working days, the agency that is a
party to the action is not liable for any claimed
back wages or benefits from the expiration of the
permitted time for issuing the decision until the
decision is issued.
(g) The board's decision is binding upon the
agency.
(h) The board may order that an employee be
placed on the reappointment roster provided for
in Section 67-19-17 for assignment to another
agency.
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(7) (a) The aggrieved employee or t h e agency may
appeal the decision of t h e Personnel Review
Board to the district court of the district in which
the position is located or to t h e district court of
Salt Lake County within 20 days from t h e issuance of t h e decision
(b) On appeal to the district court, the board's
findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive
(8) (a) An applicant for a position in Utah state
government who alleges prohibited practices in
hiring as defined in Section 34-35-6, may submit
a complaint in writing to t h e department head
where t h e alleged action occurred
(b) The department head shall follow the procedures of Subsection (4) to determine t h e validity of t h e claim
(c) If no decision is issued by the department
head within ten days, or if the applicant is dissatisfied with the decision, the applicant may submit a complaint to the Utah Antidiscrimination
Division pursuant to Subsection 67-19-21, within
ten days from receipt of the decision or expiration
of the time for a decision, whichever is first 1968
67-19-26. Severability of provisions — Compliance with requirements for federally
aided programs.
(1) If any provision of this chapter or of any regulation or order issued thereunder or t h e application of
any provision of this chapter to any person or circumstance is held m \ ahd, the remainder of this chapter
and the application of provision of this chapter or
regulation or orders issued under it to persons or circumstances other t h a n those to which it is held invalid shall still be regarded as having t h e force and
effect of law
(2) If any part of this chapter is found to be in conflict with federal requirements which a r e a condition
precedent to the allocation of federal funds to the
state, the conflicting part of this chapter shall be inoperative solely to t h e extent of the conflict and with
respect to the agencies directly affected, and such
findings shall not affect t h e operation of the remainder of this chapter in its application to the agencies
concerned
(3) Notwithstanding any provisions in this chapter
to the contrary, no regulation shall be adopted which
would deprive the state or any of its departments or
institutions of federal grants or other forms of financial assistance, and the rules and regulations promulgated hereunder shall include standards, provisions,
terms and conditions for personnel engaged in the
administration of federally aided programs, which
shall, in all respects, comply with the necessary requirements for a qualified personnel system under
the standards applicable to personnel engaged in the
administration of federally aided programs
1979
67-19-27.

Leave of a b s e n c e with pay for disabled e m p l o y e e s covered under other

civil service systems.
Any current or future employee in a position covered by the highway patrol or operator and chauffeur
license examiners civil service systems a t t h e time of
the effective date of this act, who is injured in the
course of employment shall be given a leave of absence with full pay d u n n g t h e period of temporary
disability This compensation shall be in lieu of all
other compensation provided by law except hospital
and medical services which are now or may hereafter
be provided by law

67-20-3

Any current or future employee in a position covered by the highway patrol civil service system a t the
time of the effective date of this act, who is 100%
disabled through a criminal act upon his person by
the use of a deadly weapon while in t h e lawful discharge of his duties shall be given a leave of absence
with full compensation until h e reaches t h e retirement age of 62 years
1979
67-19-28. Merger of civil service s y s t e m s .
Prior to J a n u a r y 1, 1980, the director, after consultation with the commissioner of public safety and the
superintendent of the highway patrol, shall promulgate rules to effect t h e merger of the highway patrol
and operator and chauffeur license examiners civil
service systems with the provisions of this act Rules
governing t h e standards of conduct and performance
of employees shall take into account differences in
responsibilities among varying classes of employees
1979

67-19-29. Violation a misdemeanor.
Any person who knowingly violates a provision of
this chapter is guilty of a class A misdemeanor 1979
CHAPTER 20
VOLUNTEER GOVERNMENT
WORKERS ACT
Section
67-20-1
67-20-2
67-20-3
67-20-4
67-20-5
67-20-6

Short title
Definitions
Purposes for which volunteer considered a
government employee
Approval of \olunteer
Repealed
Workers' compensation benefits

67-20-1. Short title.
This chapter is known as the "Volunteer Government Workers Act"
1986
67-20-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter
(1) "Agency" means any department, institution, office, college, university, authority, division, board, bureau, commission, council, or other
agency of the state, or any county, city, town,
school district, special improvement or taxing
district, or any other political subdivision
(2) "Community service worker" means any
person who h a s been convicted of a criminal offense, any youth who h a s been adjudged delinquent, or any person or youth who h a s been diverted from t h e c n m m a l or juvenile justice system and who performs a public service for an
agency as a condition of his sentence, diversion,
probation, or parole
(3) "Volunteer" means any person who donates
service without pay or other compensation except
expenses actually and reasonably incurred as approved by the supervising agency "Volunteer"
does not include any person participating in
h u m a n subjects research to the extent that the
participation is governed by federal law or regulation inconsistent with this chapter, nor does it
include community service workers
1988
67-20-3. Purposes for which volunteer considered a government employee.
A volunteer is considered a government employee
for purposes of

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT RULES
RULES R20-11-1 AND 2

R20-11

DISCIPLIHE

R20-11-1

Disciplinary action

Noncompliance with these rules, departmental safety policies, professional
standards adopted by a department, work place policies, and such matters as
inefficiency, incompetency, failure to maintain skills or adequate performance
levels, insubordination, disloyalty to the orders of a superior, misfeasance,
malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office or to advance the good of the public
interest shall be cause for disciplinary action.
11-1.(1) The type and severity of any disciplinary action taken shall be
governed by principles of due process to include:
(l)(a)

Consistent application

(l)(b)

Prior knowledge of rules and standards

(l)(c)

Determination of fact

(l)(d)

Timely notice of noncompliance

(l)(e)

Opportunity to respond and rebut as defined herein

11-1.(2) If an agency head determines that a career service employee is
charged with aggravated or repetitive misconduct or that retention
of a career service employee would endanger the peace and safety of
others or pose grave threat to the public interest, the agency
head, pending an Investigation to determine fact upon which
disciplinary action may be taken, may utilize one or more of the
following options:
(2)(a)

The employee may be placed on administrative paid leave for up
to thirty working days. If more time is needed beyond thirty
working days, written authorization must be obtained from the
Director.

(2)(b)

The employee may be temporarily reassigned to another position
and/or different work location at the same rate of pay pending
the completion of the investigation.

11-1.(3) In all cases, except as provided under 67-19-18(2) UCA,
disciplinary action includes the following:
(3)(a)

The agency representative notifies the employee in writing of
the proposed discipline and the reasons therefore;

(3)(b)

The employee has five working days within which to reply in
writing and have the reply considered by the agency
representative before discipline is imposed;

(3)(c)

An employee waives the right to respond and discipline may be
imposed without a response if the employee does not reply
within the time frames stated in these rules or as established
by the agency representative, whichever is greater.

11-1

11-1.(4)

After an employee has been informed of the reasons for the
proposed discipline and has been given an opportunity to
respond and be responded to, discipline may be imposed by the
agency representative as appropriate. The type and severity
of discipline may take into consideration the severity of the
occurrence, the repeated nature of violations, prior
disciplinary actions, previous oral warnings and discussions,
the employee's past work record, the effect on agency
operations and potential of the violations for causing damage
to persons or property. Disciplinary action may include one
or more of the following options:

(4)(a)

Written reprimand

(4)(b)

Suspension of the employee without pay up to thirty calendar
days per occurrence requiring discipline.

(4)(c)

Demotion of the employee utilizing one of the following
methods as provided by law (67-19-18):

(1)

An employee may be moved from a position in one class to a
position in another class having a lower entrance salary if
the duties of the position have been reduced for disciplinary
reasons.

(2)

When duties of the position have not changed an employee's
salary shall be reduced by moving the employee back in the
range, as determined by the department head or designee.

(4)(d)

A department head shall dismiss or demote an employee only in
accordance with the provision of 67-19-18(3) UCA 1953 as
amended. (See R20-11-2 of these rules.)

(4)(e)

Disciplinary actions are subject to the grievance and appeals
procedure provided by law.

11-1.(5) At the time disciplinary action is imposed the employee shall be
notified of the discipline, the reasons for the discipline, the
effective date and length of the discipline and the standard of
conduct necessary to avoid further discipline.
R20-11-2

Dismissal or demotion

An employee may be dismissed or demoted for cause as explained in Section
10-2 and 11-1 of these rules as follows:
11-2.(1) An agency head may dismiss an employee having other than career
service status, without right of appeal, for cause upon providing
written notification to the employee specifying the reasons for the
dismissal and the effective date.

11-2

11-2.(2) No person shall be dismissed or demoted from a career service
position unless the department head or designee has observed the
following procedures and the Grievance Procedure Rules:
(2)(a)

The department head or designee shall notify the employee in
writing of the specific reasons for the dismissal or demotion.

(2)(b)

The employee shall have no less than five working days to
reply and have the reply considered by the department head.

(2)(c)

The employee shall have an opportunity to be heard by the
department head or designee.

(2)(d)

Following such a hearing an employee may be dismissed or
demoted if the department head finds adequate cause or reason.

11-2.(3) A department head or designee may suspend an employee pending the
administrative appeal to the department head as provided by law
(67-19-18(2) UCA).

11-3
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brief or memorandum of law prior to the hearing.
RC65-1-23. PaWk Hearings
The parties shall be entitled to an open and public
hearing unless the exclusion rule is invoked or unless
there are grounds to justify an executive session.
23.1 Closing Hearings. All Grievance Procedure
hearings may be open to the public, except for situations in which the Administrator, the Board, or
the Hearing Officer closes by executive session either
a portion of the hearing or the entire hearing when
substantial reason exists for not having an open
hearing, or in cases where the employee so requests.
(Reference: Attorney General Opinion No. 79-366
and the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act.)
23.1.1 An evidentiary /Step 5 hearing may be
closed in part or in its entirety when the proceeding
involves questions about an employee's character,
professional competence, or physical or mental
health. (Reference: Utah Open and Public Meetings
Act Manual, p. 15.)
23.2 Sealing Evidence. The Administ rator, the
Board, or the Hearing Officer can exercise authority
to seal the evidence when circumstances so warrant.
23.3 Media Presence. All hearings at the evidentiary/Step 5 and appellate/Step 6 levels are open
to the media, unless otherwise closed due to rule
23.1 above, except that television cameras shall not
be permitted at the evidentiary/Step 5 proceedings.
23.4 Dissemination. The Administrator has discretion to release copies of legal decisions, orders,
and rulings to media representatives upon the
latter's request. Portions of or entire legal decisions
and orders may be withheld if deemed to be of a
sensitive, privileged, or highly confidential nature.
R665-1-24. Declaratory Rulings
This rule provides a procedure for submission and
review of, and requests for, disposition of, declaratory rulings on the applicability of statutes, administrative rules, and orders either governing or
issued by the Board or the Administrator.
24.1 Definition. A declaratory ruling is an administrative interpretation or explanation of rights,
status, or other legal relations under a statute, rule,
or order.
24.1.1 Applicability. The applicability of a declaratory ruling refers to the determination of whether
a statute, rule, or order should be applied, and if
so, how the law should be applied to the facts.
24.2 Petition Procedure. Any person or agency
with proper standing may petition for a declaratory
ruling.
24.2.1 The petition shall be addressed and delivered to the Administrator.
24.2.2 The petition shall be date-stamped upon
receipt in the PRB Office.
24.3 Petition Form. The petition shall:
24.3.1 Be clearly designated as a request for a
declaratory ruling.
24.3.2 Identify the statute, rule, or order to be
reviewed.
24.3.3 Describe the circumstances in which applicability is to be reviewed.
24.3.4 Describe the reason or need for the applicability review.
24.3.5 Include an address and telephone number
where the petitioner can be reached during regular
work days.
24.3.6 Be signed by the petitioner.
24.4 Petition Review and Disposition. As appropriate the Administrator or the Board shall:
24.4.1 Review and consider the petition.
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24.4.2 Prepare a declaratory ruling, stating: (1)
the applicability or non-applicability of the statute,
rule, or order at issue; (2) the reasons for the applicability or non-applicability of the statute, rule, or
order; and (3), any requirements imposed on a petitioning person or agency, or any other person according to the ruling.
24.4.3 The Administrator or the Board may: (1)
interview the petitioner or the agency representative;
(2) hold a public hearing on the petition; (3) consult
with legal counsel or the Attorney General; or (4)
take any action which the Board, in its judgment
deems necessary in order to provide the petition
with an adequate review and due consideration.
24.5 Time Frame and Service. The Board or the
Administrator shall prepare the declaratory ruling
without unnecessary delay and shall send the petitioner a copy of the ruling by certified mail or by the
State's Central Mailing system, as appropriate, or
shall send the petitioner notice of progress in preparing the ruling, within 30 days of receipt of the
petition.
24.6 Records. The PRB Office shall retain the
petition and the original of the declaratory ruling in
its records.
24.7 Board Initiated Rulings. The Board on its
own motion may issue a declaratory order to terminate a controversy or to remove uncertainty.
24.8 Statutory Construction. Questions requiring
the construction of statutory provisions shall be
submitted to the Attorney General for a formal or
informal letter opinion.
24.9 The Board or the Administrator may refuse
to issue a declaratory ruling if the question in issue
is one that is being contested in a case air eady
before the Board.
24.10 Status of Rulings. A declaratory ruling has
the same status and binding effect as any other
ruling or order by the Board or the Administrator.
R665-1-25. Evidentiary/Step 5 Hearings
25.1 Hearing Officers. The Administrator is authorized to appoint Hearing Officers to preside over
hearings, receive evidence, conduct informal administrative proceedings, and issue written decisions in
accordance with these rules. Hearing Officers shall
be compensated for each case, pursuant to personal
service contracts.
25.1.1 Hearing Officers shall conduct hearings in
a manner prescribed by these rules.
25.2 Authority of Hearing Officers. The Hearing
Officer shall conduct a fair and impartial hearing
and shall:
25.2.1 Administer oaths and affirmations, unlesf
such administering is delegated to a court reporter.
25.2.2 Maintain order, insure the development o
a clear and complete record, rule upon offers o
proof, and receive relevant evidence.
25.2.3 Regulate the course and conduct of tb
hearing, set times for the filing of document/
provide for the taking of testimony by deposition c
affidavit if necessary, examine any witness in orck
to clarify issues, and direct witnesses to testify.
25.2.4 Limit the number of times any witness mi
testify; limit immaterial, repetitious, or cumulate
testimony; set reasonable limits on the amount i
time each witness may testify and be era
examined; maintain decorum and exclude any (ft
uptive persons; designate the order of examinirk
of witnesses; limit the scope of examination ai
cross-examination; and exclude from being pre*
any witness being present as an observer, wh(
Coosa
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determine whether such a proceeding is justifiable,
and whether it will be held on the record. Any
appeal from a subsequent reconsideration determination issued by the original Hearing Officer must
be filed with the Administrator within 10 working
days of the most recently issued determination.
R665-1-26. The Board and The Appellate
Procedure
26.1 Board Members' Terms. The Board shall
consist of five members, each appointed by the
Governor, for four year terms or portions thereof.
26.1.1 Three Board members* terms shall be coterminous with the Governor's term and two
members' terms shall begin January 1, of the third
year of the Governor's regular term in office.
26.1.2 The Board members shall hold office until
their successors are appointed.
26.1.3 The Board members shall be persons qualified by knowledge of the field of administrative
procedures and merit principles in public employment.
26.2 Political Affiliation. No Board member shall
be a member of any local, State or national committee of a political party nor serve as an officer or
member of a committee in any partisan political
club, nor hold or be a candidate for any paid public
office.
26.2.1 No more than three Board members shall
be from the same political party.
26.3 Organization. The Board shall be organized
as follows: 26.3.1 The Governor shall annually
designate one of the Board members to serve as
chairman.
26.3.2 Any three Board members shall constitute
a quorum to conduct business, to hear appeals, and
to make decisions.
26.3.3 The actions of a majority of those present
at a Board hearing, at which a quorum is present,
shall be actions of the Board.
26.3.4 Board members may only be removed for
cause by the Governor.
26.3.5 Absence from three consecutive Board
meetings without valid reason may constitute cause
for removal.
26.3.6 Each Board member shall receive a per
diem payment for official meetings, hearings, and
Board activities, and reimbursement for travel expenses, as provided by State law.
26.4 Duties and Responsibilities. The Board is the
final administrative body that reviews appeals from
employees or agencies pertaining to promotions,
dismissals, demotions, wages, salary, benefits, reductions in force, and disciplinary actions which have
not been resolved at an earlier stage in the appeals
process.
26.4.1 The Board is a quasi-judicial body which
functions at an appellate level of the State's Grievance Procedure.
26.5 Authority. The Board shall have authority to
subpoena witnesses, documents, or other evidence in
conjunction with any inquiry, investigation, hearing
or other proceeding.
26.5.1 Any Board member may administer oaths
and certify official acts.
26.5.2 The Board may, at its discretion, order
that an employee be placed on the reappointment
roster as provided for at Utah Code Annotated
Section 67-19-17, for assignment to another
agency.
26.6 Briefs. An appeal hearing before the Board
will be based upon die evidentiary record previously
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established by the Hearing Officer. No additional or
new evidence is permitted.
26.6.1 The Appellant in a Step 6 proceeding must
obtain the t ranscript of the Step 5 hearing. (Refer
to rule 15.6.) After receipt of the transcript, the
Appellant has a 10 working day period to file six
copies of a brief with the Administrator. Additionally, the Respondent must be provided with a copy
of the Appellant's brief.
26.6.2 Upon receipt of a copy of the Appellant's
brief, the Respondent then has a 10 working day
period to file six copies of a reply brief with the
Administrator.
26.6.3 Briefs are to be distributed to Board
members within approximately 20 days after availability of the transcript. The Board will then endeavor to schedule a hearing within the third 10 day
period. Hence, from the date of formal filing until
the Board hearing, approximately 30 days shall have
elapsed.
26.6.4 All briefs must be hand delivered or sent
U.S. Postal Service postage prepaid, unless the
State's Central Mailing system is used.
26.6.5 Briefs will be date stamped upon receipt in
the PRB Office.
26.6.6 All briefs must be received in the PRB
Office before the appeal hearing/Step 6 can be
scheduled.
26.6.7 The time frame for receiving briefs shall be
modified or waived only for good cause as determined by the Administrator.
26.7 Rules of Procedure. The following rules are
applicable to appeal hearings before the Board:
26.7.1 Dismissal of Appeal. Upon a motion by
either party or upon its own motion, the Board may
dismiss any appeal prior to holding a formal appeal
hearing if the appeal is clearly moot, without merit,
not properly filed or not within the scope of the
Board's authority.
26.7.2 Notice. Written notice of the date, time,
place and issues for hearing by the Board shall be
given to the aggrieved employee, to the employee's
counsel or representative, to the agency, and to the
agency's counsel or representative, at least 5 days
before the date set for the hearing.
26.7.3 Compelling Evidence. The Board may
compel evidence in the conduct of its appeals and
may remand cases to the original Hearing Officer
for additional evidence, as appropriate.
26.7.4 Oral Argument/Time Limitation. As a
general rule, the Board will restrict the oral argument portion of a proceeding to 30 minutes, or less,
per party. The Board may grant additional time as it
deems appropriate.
26.7.5 Oral Argument Set Aside. If the Board
determines that oral argument is unnecessary, the
parties shall be so notified, but are expected to
appear before the Board on the date and time set in
order to answer any questions raised by the Board
members.
26.7.6 Oral argument or written memoranda may
be required of the parties at the Board's discretion.
26.8 Standards of Review. The Board's decisions
shall be based upon the following:
26.8.1 The Board's appellate decisions shall be
supported by credible substantial evidence.
26.8.2 The Board's standards of review consist of
determining: (1) whether the Hearing Officer's evidentiary decision was supported by substantial evidence; (2) whether that decision is warranted by the
facts and circumstances of the case on appeal; and
(3) whether the Hearing Officer's findings of fact
CODE«C0
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GLOSSARY

Admission: A statement (including an action or omission) that i s inconsistent
w i t h a party 1 s i n t e r e s t , defense, or allegation, and that may be offered
against that party t o prove or disprove a material f a c t .
Allegation: An assertion made by a party i n a legal/administrative
proceeding, which the party t r i e s t o prove.
A r b i t r a r y : An act performed capriciously; done without adequate determining
p r i n c i p l e ; not done according t o sound reason or judgment; depending on w i l l
alone, without f a i r , s o l i d , and substantial cause. (See Capricious.)
Arguendo: For purposes of making an argument, a presumption that c e r t a i n
f a c t s or principles are t r u e .
Argumentative Question: A question not intended t o e l i c i t f a c t s , but rather
t o present or create an argument.
Bona f i d e :
Capricious:
AititraryD

I n good f a i t h ; l e g a l l y v a l i d ; without deceit or fraud.
Motivated or acting on whim or impulse; unpredictable.

(See

Character Evidence: Evidence about a person's t r a i t s or q u a l i t i e s , usually
offered through opinion testimony or testimony as t o reputation.
Circumstantial Evidence: Evidence which i s of an i n d i r e c t nature from which
the existence or non-existence of a material f a c t may be i n f e r r e d . (Compare
with Direct Evidence.)
C o l l a t e r a l Estoppel: A l e g a l doctrine holding that l e g a l and f a c t u a l issues
that were resolved i n one proceeding may be viewed as conclusively established
i n a l a t e r proceeding under c e r t a i n circumstances. For example, an employee's
p r i o r c r i m i n a l conviction may estop that employee from denying the factual
basis of the criminal proceeding. (Compare with Res Judicata.)
Competency: The presence of those characteristics (or the absence of those
d i s a b i l i t i e s ) that render a witness l e g a l l y f i t and q u a l i f i e d t o give
testimony. Applies i n a s i m i l a r sense t o documents or other objects of
evidence. Describes evidence that i s admissible by the t r i e r of f a c t
(presiding o f f i c i a l ) i n determining questions of f a c t . Competency relates t o
the personal q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ) of the witness; c r e d i b i l i t y relates t o the
witness's truthfulness.
Corroborating Evidence: Evidence supplementary t o evidence already submitted
and tending t o strengthen and confirm i t .
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TESTIMONY OF KEVIN GRAY
REGARDING TRAINING
PAGES 44-60

1

on and go for 20 minutes.

2

KEVIN GRAY,

3

having been first duly sworn, was called as a

4

witness by the Respondent and testified upon his

5

oath as follows:

6
7

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. SANDERS:

8

Q

Would you state your name for the record, please?

9

A

My name is Kevin Gray.

10

Q

Last name is spelled?

11

A

G-r-a-y.

12

Q

Thank you.

13

Mr. Gray, are you currently employed

by the Department of Corrections?

14

A

Yes, sir, I am.

15

Q

In what capacity?

16

A

I'm the training coordinator for the Department of

17

Corrections.

18

Q

How long have you held that position?

19

A

Approximately 24 months.

20

Q

Prior to that what position did you hold?

21

A

Prior to coming to the Department of Corrections I

22

worked for the University of Utah in the Parking Services

23

Division.

Handled the supervisory function there.

24

Q

Did you perform any training duties there?

25

A

Yes, sir, I did.
44

*

Q

Prior to that position where were you working?

2

A

For one year prior to the University I worked for

3

Mr. Lynn Lund in his law firm as a correctional consultant

4

and provided jail training around the Western United

5

States.

6

the Salt Lake County Sheriff's office in the jail division.

7

Primary function after about 1975 was director of training

8

and personnel and handled all the training responsibilities

9

for the jail.

And prior to that I worked for eight years with

10 I

Q

Have you had any other experience in training?

n |

A

Yes, sir, I'm a consultant with the National

12

Institute of Corrections and have traveled around the

13

country training jail officers and correctional officers in

14 I jail operations.

I've been a consultant for the Bureau of

15

Indian Affairs, and I was a consultant with the firm of

16

DeLand & Associates provided, again, correctional

17

consultation and training to jails around the country.

18

Q

19

training or training management experience have you had?

20 |
21

A

From approximately 1975 to the present, about 12

I years,

22
23
24

So, approximately just roughly how many years of

,

Q

This has been your primary function?

A

Yes.

Q

Would you describe the responsibilities you

25 I currently perform, what types of duties are normal for you?
45

1

A

The present duties that I have with the Department

2

of Corrections for the operation of the pre-service

3

academy, which is the certification course for all
correctional officers.

We run a nine-week certification

5

course making certain that the curriculum is up to the

6

level that it needs to be, that the subject matter that

7

we're teaching is relevant to corrections, and that those

8

people who are involved in the training as participants are

9

meeting all of the requirements for graduation.

10

Q

Do you ever teach classes yourself?

11

A

I teach a number of classes in preservice and I

12
13
14
15

have taught a number of classes in inservice training,
Q

Would you differentiate between these two for the

Court just as a matter of explanation.
A

Inservice training is the training that follows up

16

after basic training.

17

all certified officers to receive a minimum of 20 hours of

18

inservice training each year.

19
20

Q

And it is required by state law for

Have you ever taught a class on the abuse of

force?

21

A

Yes, I have.

22

Q

Did you teach a class —

23
24

did you teach this class

in February of 1986?
A

I do recall teaching it from the document that you

25 I have there.
46

1

Q

Would you identify this document, please?

2

A

For each inservice class that we teach we have a

3

participant sign-up sheet and all people who attend that

4

particular class are required to sign their name showing

5

that they were in attendance at the class.

6

also shows the title of the class, the dates, who the

The document

7 J instructor was, where it was taught and the total number of
g

, hours

9

l

10

Q

on that sheet?

n
)2

13
14
15
16
17

19
20

22

A

Yes, sir.

Q

Would you identify that, please?

A

It appears to be P.S. Sucher.

Q

Would you identify that individual, please?

A

Mr. Sucher is seated across the way from me.

Q

Its your testimony that Mr. Sucher was in

attendance at that class?

18

21

Is there a particular name that's been highlighted

—

A

As far as I can recall he was there, yes.

Q

Would you very briefly describe this course?

A

This course is on use and abuse of force.

let me take out my
Q

document.

And the

—

Perhaps, Mr. Gray, would you perhaps identify this
We can save some time that way.

23
24
25

A

This is the handout and lesson plan that I use for

that particular class.
47

Q

How do you know that this was for that particular

class?
A

It's the only use and abuse of force class taught

in the institution.

I'm the only instructor and I prepared

that document.
Q

So, it is your testimony these are the notes,

handouts?
A

And lesson plan.

Q

And lesson plan that you used in that particular

course?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

Very briefly, could you describe the nature of

this course, what is taught?

Just basically give a

narrative of what the course itself involves.
A

The principal behind this particular course is to

instruct the officer on some of the reasons that force is
used, when force can be used in an institution, to instruct
the officers on the theory that the minimum amount of force
is what is required in handling inmates in any given
situation.

It discusses some of the causes for the abuse

of force and some of the consequences

that a correctional

officer may face if excessive force is used in any
situation.
Q

What types of consequences would be potentially

involved in an abuse case?
48

1

A

We instruct the officers during this particular

2

class that the types of consequences could range anywhere

3

J from a verbal reprimand to termination, lawsuits filed by

4

the inmates for cruel and unusual punishment, and even

5

criminal charges in the event that the offense was serious

6

enough•

7

Q

What makes the difference in terms of —

8

seems to run the whole gamut.

9

difference, the factors that would be considered?

this one

What would be the

10

A

In what type of

11

Q

In making a determination if discipline is

12
13

—

appropriate?
A

Well, I believe one of the factors would be

14

violation of policy and procedure.

15

violation of policy and procedure, if there was a violation

16

of state law, or if there was a violation of an inmate's

17

civil rights would all have an affect on determining what

18

level of consequences the officer may face.

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Q

If there was in fact a

Would the condition of the inmate be considered as

a factor in this?
A

Obviously if the inmate is seriously injured as a

result then force is even more excessive«
Q

What about the condition of the inmate in terms of

his ability to defend himself, for instance, whether or not
he was shackled, handcuffed, et cetera?
49

1

A

2

If the inmate was fully restrained at the time,

then his ability to resist and therefore protect himself

3

would be at a very minimum.

4

And that would even make the

force excessive.

5

Q

Okay.

Very briefly, if you would just describe

I for the Court what this document contains and so on.
7 l

8

The lesson plan is —

as I mentioned earlier talks

I about how corrections is evolved, how force in early

9

10

A

corrections was basically left up to the administration.
I The Court did not have much to do with what was done in

11

institutions.

How over the years as society has changed

12 I its philosophy on dealing with prisoners they have been
13

shocked at some of the things that went on in institutions

14

with abuse of prisoners and cruel and unusual punishment.

15

16

J

So, this change came about because of those and
required that the officers use only a minimum amount of

i? I force in dealing with the prisoners.

It goes on to discuss

18

a continuum of force showing the least amount of force

19

working up to the ultimate force, which is that of deadly

20

force,

21
22

Q

Were any handouts prepared to describe that

continuum of force?

23

A

Yes, there were.

24

Q

I f m going to show you two documents.

Would you

25 J identify these, please?
50

1

2
3
4

5

A

The two documents are very similar.

One is the

least restrictive alternative.
Q

I believe that's contained in the packet, Your

Honor, approximately two or three pages in.
A

It is a step approach to the use of force.

6

Minimum amount of force being taught.

The greatest amount

7

of force being strike, and the second document is abuse of

8

force continuum.

That discusses in greater detail each one

g J of the steps and the least restrictive alternative from
10 i talk up to and including deadly force.
n
12

Q
pages.

I believe there are about, perhaps, two or three
If I may approach the bench.
Mr. Gray, on that continuum at what point is a

13

14 I staff member essentially authorized to strike an inmate?
15 i

A

There would be a number of situations that would

16 I determine if a staff member could strike.
17

determined by what level the inmate is on.

One, it would be
If the inmate

18 I is on the same level such as a striking the officer, the
19
20

officer has the right to protect and defend himself.
If there are more than one inmate involved in the

21

situation the officer may have to use more force in

22

protecting himself.

23
24
25

If there are weapons involved the

officer would be allowed to use more force than would
normally be necessary for one inmate with no weapons.
The number of officers involved would determine on
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how much force is used.
2

3
4

Generally more officers involved

I required less force.
Q

So, as the number of essentially staff goes up

force should drop down.

5

A

Yes, sir.

6

Q

With the one condition of the inmate, again,

7

8
9

whether or not he is restrained?
A

Yes.

Restrained is about midway up the force

continuum and if you have the inmate restrained, then, that

10

would be the least amount of force used.

11

above that would be excessive.

12

Q

I notice at the —

Anything over and

on the one page noted, called

13

the use of force continuum there are certain words which

14

are typed in underneath the words such as touch, hold, and

15

so on.

16

A

Would you describe why these are included there?
It is a gradual process of escalation.

The least

17

amount of force that anybody can use is to talk to someone.

18

Then as you progress or it escalates you get into touching,

19

placing holds on a prison, moving a prisoner from place to

20

place.

21

Then moving up higher on the scale, strike, where

22

you actually have to strike an inmate, or the use of deadly

23

force.

24

might be employed.

25

Q

In this case would be firearms or night sticks that

Mr. Gray, as part of the process do you talk about
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when force is appropriate in terms of the actions —

the

possible actions and so on?
A

We —

when we discuss this particular issue we

instruct the officers that they should be on the level that
the inmate is on and no higher.

But once any danger has

passed, then any force that's used is abusive.
inmate is —

So, if the

has stopped his aggressiveness and is no

longer in the attacking mode, then anything that the
officer does above and beyond that may be excessive.
Q

Let me create a hypothetical and ask you to judge,

if you will.
struggling.

An inmate has been acting out.

He's been

However, at this point he has been handcuffed.

He's been placed in restraints and is being carried by
staff.

He then without any action at that time — what

action would be justified
MR. SUCHER:

—

I object.

That requires a judgment

and that's the finders of fact —
MR. SANDERS:

Yes, sir.

I believe we've qualified

this witness as an expert in the area of training.
THE COURT:

He's well qualified.

A

Would you please restate your question.

Q

Creating a hypothetical, if an inmate has been

acting out, kicking, et cetera, and then has been
restrained with both physical restraints and by a number of
officers with other officers in the area, if an inmate did
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1

something at that point, acted out, kicked, spit, what

2

action would be appropriate?

3

A

Probably no more than restraining him with the

4

number of officers that are involved.

5

easily restrained at that point without using any more

6

force.

7

what?

8

Q

Handcuffs, leg irons, plus being held.

9

A

Yeah, that would be about as high as you would go

The inmate would be

When you're talking restraints you're talking about
Handcuffs, leg irons?

10 J unless, of course, the inmate broke loose, was able to get
out of the restraints.

11
12

I matter.
Q

13

t4 terms.
15

Mr. Gray, I'll ask you to refer to page 4 of the
There's a phrase, I believe it's the next to the

J bottom on the right-hand side.

Phrase is, "After the

danger is over force that is used becomes abusive." Would

16
17

Then that would be a different

I you explain that phrase?

18 J

A

Just a very simple theory that is general in most

19

law enforcement where we find most of our problems occur is

20

that after the inmate or the suspect has been restrained

21

and there is no longer any danger to the officer, the

22

people around him, any kind of force used over and above

23

that restraint or that level of force that the inmate is on

24

would be classified as abusive.

25

Q

I notice that on the left-hand side of these
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1

documents there are certain phrases put in there, I

2

believe, under the title Instructor's Notes. Would you

3

explain what these are, please?

4

A

In the lesson plan development there are basically

5

two columns, the instructor notes and the contents. The

6

instructor notes are just reminders to the instructor to

7

make sure that they emphasized that particular portion of

8

the content.

9 I
10
11
12
13

Q

How many times have you taught this class?

A

I would have to say that this particular class I

have instructed at least 50 times.
Q

Is it your normal procedure to outline fairly

extensively?

14

A

Yes.

Yes, sir.

15

Q

On the next page, page 5, the one, two, three,

16

fourth printout down there's a statement, "Enforcing

17

regulations minimal force should be used since danger of it

18

becoming corporal punishment is greater in these

19

situations."

20

A

The law allows institutions to use force in

21

controlling inmates and to use force to enforce rules and

22

regulations.

It's a very fine line that they draw here

because the courts have come out and repeatedly said that
23
24
25

corporal punishment is not allowed in institutions.
Q

By "corporal punishment," please define the term
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1

the way you would use it.

2
3

A

Corporal punishment is any kind of physical

J punishment or physical —

any type of physical activity

4

that would denote punishment.

5

things from whipping posts and racks and sweat boxes to

6

actual physical abuse such as beatings and whippings and so

7

on.

8
9

Q

If you had to summarize your course what

would you say about it?

10

take?

11

A

12

Okay.

In the early days it was

What —

how long did this course

This course is approximately two hours and has

most recently been expanded to a three-hour block.

13

Q

Are there any handouts provided to staff?

14

A

Yes.

We normally pass out a —

an outline of the

15

course, which is the first two pages or three pages of the

16

document.

17

alternative, the handout on the causes of the abuse of

18

force, and the force continuum.

The handout on the least restrictive

19

Q

Do you use any examples in this course?

20

A

This particular course has some practical problems

21

that are used.

22

they're —

23

into some practical situations using some prepared policy

24

and procedure as our guidelines.

25

Q

Depending on the time allotment and if

if we have not expired all the time we can go

Okay.

Do you remember, realizing it f s been two
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i

years, do you remember whether or not these were used in

2

that course?

3

A

I do not recall if we were able to get into the

4

actual practical on this particular course.

5

divide the group into —

6

think we were able to do it with this class but being that

7

it was almost two years ago I don't recall for sure.

8
g

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Q

Normally we

the class into several groups. I

Do you remember if the handouts were provided to

I individuals that day?
A

Off the top of my head, no, I cannot recall that

the handouts were there for the class.
Q

Do you have any reason to believe that the

handouts were not provided?
A

No, I don't.

Q

Is it your normal procedure to provide those to

staff?
A

Y e s , it is.

Q

M r . Gray, let me turn to just training in general.

Are staff provided with any training on defensive tactics?
A

Yes, they are.

Q

When was this training started?

A

The defensive tactics arrest and control course

was begun in July of 1986 and has continued during each
23
inservice training year since.
24
Q

Are individuals of the captain and lieutenant rank

25
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1

invited to attend that training?

2

A

Yes, they are.

3

Q

Why?

4

A

It is training that's useful for all members of

5
6
7

the department that deal with inmates..
Q

Has the training process within the Department of

Corrections changed in recent years?

8

A

Yes, it has,

9

Q

How so?

A

When I began in 1985 we began to make changes by

10 J

11 I implementing needs assessments where we would contact
12 | officers, have them tell us some of the things they thought
13 I were essential to the training process.

We have begun to

14 J develop an instructor corps, standardized lesson plans, and

15

a standardized curriculum for both inservice and

16 l preservice.
17
18
19

20

Q

So, these training —

the training materials now

are what would you say, more extensive?
A

Yes, much more extensive than they were when I

began my employment.

21 |

Q

Is there any reason why this has happened?

22 |

A

Well, the main reason is that there is a great

23
24
25

need for training.

An officer cannot do his job properly

unless he's adequately trained and court case after court
case has come out citing the need for training.

Officers
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1

2
3

especially in corrections.
Q

Let me turn next to your history.

You mentioned

you had worked in the Salt Lake County Jail.

4

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

5

Q

During that time were you ever spit upon by an

6
7
8

inmate?
A

I do not recall being spit upon by an inmate.

I

do recall having urine thrown in my face on at least two

9 ( occasions.
10

Q

What did you do?

11

A

We restrained the inmate.

We had three or four

12

officers went into the cell, brought the inmate out of the

13

cell, and put him in what we call behavior modification,

14

15

| which is an isolation, submitted disciplinary reports and
turned it over to the disciplinary committee.

16

Q

Have you ever had to physically hit an inmate?

17

A

No, sir, I have not.

Q

Have you ever had to use physical restraints on an

18
19
20
21

inmate?
A

Yes, sir, I have.

Q

Would you describe the difference between these

22 I two, the circumstances?
23

A

In the physical restraint it was just taking hold

24

of the inmate, restraining his arms, holding him to the

25

floor with —

more often than not there was more than one
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1

officer involved.

2

Q

Have you ever been kicked by an inmate?

3

A

Yes, I have.

Q

What action did you take then?

A

We restrained the inmate, moved him into

4
5

6
7

J

isolation, and submitted disciplinary reports.
Q

Just once more to clarify for me, when you taught

8 I the class on abuse of force was Mr. Sucher present?
9

A

10
11

MR. SANDERS:

Thank you.

No further questions at

this time, Your Honor.

12
13

As far as I can recall, yes, he was.

THE COURT:

Do you wish to cross-examine this

witness?

14

MR. SUCHER:

15

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.
Go ahead.

Ask him what you want but I

16

think it's clear that you have a training program, probably

17

very good, and Mr. Sucher attended one class, anyway.

18

don't know that additional information is needed.

19

MR. SUCHER:

20
21
22

I

I think it is.
CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. SUCHER:
Q

Kevin, one of the criteria required in the

23

Department of Procedure manual for training to be valid is

24

that there is pre and post-tests on the subject matter

25 J presented in the course.

Was that done in this case?
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HEARING OFFICER DECISION
PAUL S. SUCHER v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
6 PRB/H.O. 88(1988)

BEFORE THE PERSONNEL REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH
OV.C3 c

In the Matter of:
:

FINDINGS OF FACT

:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,

v.

:

DECISION AND ORDER

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS.

:

PAUL S. SUCHER,
Grievant,

Respondent.

Case No.

6 PRB/H.O. 88

AUTHORITY:
In

compliance

with

Utah

Code

Annotated,

1953,

as

amended,

an

administrative hearing at Step ' 5 was held with Paul S. Sucher, Grievant,
Representing himself with the assistance of Ray Taylor of the Utah Public
Employees

Association,

and

the

Utah

State

Department

of

Corrections

represented by Michael Sanders, Management Auditor and Lynn Lund, Inspector
General, on November 24, 25, 30 and December 4, 1987, at the Utah State
Capitol.

A court

reporter made a verbatim record of the proceeaing

testimony and documentary evidence were received into evidence.
were placed

under oath.

The hearing

examiner

now makes ano

and

Witnesses
enters

following:

ISSUES:
1.

Was the Grievant, Paul S. Sucher, dismissed for just cause?

2.

If not, what is the appropriate remeay?

the

FINDINGS OF FACT:
1.

Paul S. Sucher, Grievant (herinafter "Sucher11), has been employea

by the Department of Corrections (hereinafter "Corrections") since
October 28, 1976, and was working at the Utah State Prison's Young
Adult Correctional Facility (hereinafter "YACF") at the time he was
terminated on September 14, 1987.
2.

During his employment at the Prison, Sucher1s overall performance

evaluation was above stanaard.
3.

Sucher was appointed to the rank of Lieutenant, a supervisory

position, on January 1, 1984.
4.

Sucher received a Formal Warning letter, dated May 18, 1967, from

Warden Jeffrey R. Galli, advising Sucher that his performance as a
shift leaaer during an attempted escape on February 3, 1987, was
unsatisfactory.

This letter was not placed in Sucher's personnel

file but was placed in his supervisor's file to be considered in
connection with Sucher's next performance rating.
5.

On June 19, 1987, at approximately 3:50 p.m., inmate Greg Loya

was confined to his housing unit in the YACF Starr 1 facility.
flooded his cell by plugging the toilet.

Loya

Captain Tom Bona dispatched

Officer Gerald White ana an inmate plumber to unclog Loya's toilet.
6.

Upon arriving at Loya's cell, Officer White opened the cell

door.

Loya walked out of his cell and exited the Starr 1 facility

before the main entrance door was secured.

Loya ignored Officer

White's and Officer Jasper Blocker's verbal commands to return to his
cell.
7.

As Loya exited Starr 1, Captain Bona rang the signal for all

inmates to return to their housing units (i.e., "Ring In").

8.

After exiting Starr 1, Loya approached the Central Control area

(i.e., Building Six).

As Loya arrived at Central Control, Captain

John Powers approached him.
taken to A-Block.

Loya told Powers that he wished to be

After or about this time, Captain Bona, Officer

White, and Officer Blocker approached and realized the signal had
been set off due to Loya's actions.

Captain Power exited Central

Control and went to the compound south of Central Control.
9.

At approximately the same time, Officers White and Blocker and

Captain Bona arrived at Central Control.

Sucher and Officer Dennis

Moody also arrived to assist Captain Powers with Loya.
10.

A Captain ordered Sucher to place handcuffs on Loya.

placed the handcuffs on Loya without much difficulty.

Sucher

Captain Bona

then instructed Loya to return to his Starr 1 cell, at which time
Loya became extremely agitated.
11.

As Officer Moody moved in to place a leg iron on Loya, Loya

kicked at him.

Officer Moody deflected the kick with his arm and

applied a leg iron on one leg.
nose due to Loya's kick.

Office Mooay received a cut on his

At this time, Officer Blocker took hold of

Loya by placing an arm around his upper torso while Officer White
applied a wrist lock, Captain Bona, Sucher and Officer Moody then
secured the remaining leg iron.

Sucher testified that he was also

kicked by Loya during the struggle to put the leg irons on and
received a cut on his wrist.
12.

After being restrained by handcuffs and leg irons, Loya still

refused to return to Starr 1.

Loya was then physically pickea up by

Sucher (right Leg) and Officers Moody (left leg), White (right arm)
and Blocker (left arm). Loya was carried "face up".
13.

After exiting the foyer area of Building Six and proceeding

fifteen to twenty feet towards Starr 1, Loya moved to an upright
sitting position and spat into Sucher's face.

14.

Immediately after being spit upon by Loya, Loya was observed to

re-gather spit

again

by

Officer Moody

and

punched at Loya and struck him in the mouth.

Sucher.

Sucher

then

As Sucher prepared to

strike at Loya a second time, Officer White yelled for him to stop
and Sucher withheld his second punch.
face a second time.

Loya then spit in Sucherfs

Sucher released his hold on Loya and left the

scene to wash his face.
15.

Loya's mouth was bleeding after he was struck by Sucher.

16.

Loya was turned face-down to prevent further spitting and was

carried

towards

Starr

1.

After

being

carried

face-down

for a

distance, Loya was allowed to walk to his cell.
17.

Since the appointment on July 1, 1985, of Gary W. DeLand as

Executive Director of the Department of Corrections, a Department of
Corrections Manual of Policy and Procedures has been adoptea and the
policy and procedural rules have been strictly enforced.
18.

Sucher was issued a copy of the Department of Corrections Manual

of Policy and Procedures.
19.

Sucher holds the rank of Lieutenant, which is a supervisory

position.

Persons holding supervisory positions may be treated more

harshly than non-supervisory personnel for the same misconduct.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
1.

As a merit covered employee, Sucher was entitled to all of the

rights and privileges and protections afforded such employees.
2.

"Dismissals . . . .

of career employees shall only be to advance

the public interest and for such causes as inefficiency, incompetency,
failure

to

maintain

skills

or

adequate

performance

levels,

insubordination, disloyalty to the orders of a superior, misfeasance,
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DECISION:
The Grievant, Paul S. Sucher, was terminated from his employment for
having struck inmate Greg Loya in the mouth while Loya was fully restrainea.
At the hearing, the evidence was conflicting as to whether or not Sucher
actually made contact with Loya's mouth when he struck at him.

(See Joint

Exhibit 1, Stipulation of Facts, paragraph 10.)
Sucher contended that immediately after being spit upon by Loya, Loya
was observed by him
again.

(Sucher) and Officer Dennis Mooay

to re-gather

spit

Sucher, in an attempt to stop the second spit, swung at Loya but Loya

kicked him in the chest causing him to miss Loya.
felt no contact with Loya's mouth.

Sucher testified that he

Officer Moody, who was holding Loya's left

leg, testified that he was watching Loya's mouth as he was re-gathering spit
and that while it was possible that Sucher hit Loya he did not see it and was
of the opinion that Sucher didn't make contact.

Officer Moody also testified

that he is 6'4" tall and when Loya kicked and was straightened out he couldn*t
reach Loya's mouth.

Sucher is 5'5" tall.

Sucher also contended that Loya's

mouth or lip could have been cut when the leg irons were being put on him or
when he was placed face down.
On the other hand, Officer Gerald White, who was holding Loya's right
arm, testified he saw Sucher's fist strike Loya on the mouth and that he saw
blood on Loya's mouth after he was hit.

Captain Tom Bona testified his view

was partially blocked so he couldn't see whether Sucher's fist made contact
with Loya's mouth but he heard Loya curse Sucher for hitting him and then
noticed blood on Loya's mouth.

Officer Jasper Blocker, who had hold of Loya's

left arm, testified he didn't see Sucher's fist make contact with Loya's mouth
because of the position he was in but he first saw blood on Loya's mouth as he
was being turned

over.

Captain
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his contention that this was a justifiacie act _l beif jtfer--

Loya's act of spitting in Sucherfs face was highly provocative and
was one to which many if not most persons would react by striking at the
spitter.

Sucher, however, should not have reacted in this manner.

He had

approximately ten years of experience as a peace officer at the Prison and at
the time of the incident he held the rank of lieutenant, a supervisory
position.

He knew, or should have known, that, next to the use of deadly

force, striking an inmate should be employed only when necessary to control
the inmate or to protect himself.
Sucher1 s actions not only did not conform

with the standard

of

conduct required of a correctional officer but they riskea the possibility of
seriously injuring an inmate (only Loya's lip was cut) and they exposed the
Department of Corrections to possible legal liability.

His actions violated

the following rules set forth in the Department of Corrections Manual of
Policy

and

Procedures

and

constituted

malfeasance

and/or

misfeasance

as

definea in the Personnel Management Rules, 1986 edition:
AE 02/03.01
A.

Standard of Conduct

Members will respect and protect the legal rights of all
offenders.

AE 02/03.32
A.

Members shall maintain sufficient competency to properly
perform their duties and assume the responsibilities of
their position. Members shall perform their duties in a
manner which will maintain appropriate standards of
efficiency and effectiveness in carrying out the
functions and objectives of the Department.

From the foregoing, it is the conclusion of the Examiner that the
Department of Corrections proved by substantial evidence that Sucher committed
the acts complained of and that disciplinary action was warranted.

However,

the appropriateness of the disciplinary action taken must be examined in the
light of whatever mitigating circumstances may be present.
In considering the appropriateness of disciplinary action involving a
peace officer with supervisory responsibilities, the following quotation from
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Lack of Training - Sucher contended that, he was not trained in I IOW tc
handle a situation such as the one in which Loya kicked and spit ui i I lii n i Ii i
I^Hfc, a class 01 seminar was given on Abuse of force and a lengthy outlif ie of
the instruction piesH'itetl was given those attending the class, Sucher signed
the roster fur thosr attending the class I ml he testified: I.
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received training each year in order to maintain his certification.

As such,

and through his years of experience as a peace officer he knew, or should have
known, that on occasions he would be subject to verbal abuse, be spit on, and
perhaps physically attacked, and that striking an inmate in order to control a
situation or protect himself was only a means of last resort, next to the use
of deadly force.
The Examiner believes that this contention is not entitled to much
weight as a mitigating circumstance.
Fear of Aids - Sucher contended that he struck at Loya to prevent
being spit upon a second time because of his fear of contracting AIDS from the
spit.
Prior to the Loya incident, there was no training, as such, given to
the Prison staff on the subject

of AIDS.

There was, however, an Office

Memorandum, dated November 5, 1985, issued to Prison inmates concerning AIDS
(Management's Exhibit 25) and one witness said that this was also issued to
the Prison staff.

Subsequent to the Loya incident, Prison personnel have been

issuea rubber gloves to be worn when they shake-aown a prison cell.

No

evidence was presented as to the reason for now issuing rubber gloves on a
shake-down but it does indicate a concern over the matter of AIDS-

It shoula

also be noted that prior to the Loya incident a number of the Prison employees
signed

a petition

requesting

that

all inmates

known

to have

engaged

in

homosexual practices or been a user of intravenous arugs be tested for AIDS.
With respect to the Office Memorandum on AIDS, it states, in part,
that there is no evidence that AIDS is spread by "sneezing, coughing or
spitting."
"avoiding

It also says that the risk of getting AIDS can be reducea by
the sharing

of cigarettes,

razors, and manicure

sets."

Sucher

testified that he found a pamphlet on the Prison grounds concerning AIDS and
he

recalled

that

it

said

you

shouldn't

toothbrushes in order to avoid getting AIDS.

share

cigarettes,

razors,

or

Although Sucher wasn't sure the

Office Memorandum of November 5, 1985 was the same pamphlet he saw, it appears
to have been the same one.
No evidence was presented that Loya had AIDS or that he was an

intravenous drug user or 11 ml lit engaged .1 IIUI ubtn ...i.l en I 1 il.it.-ithe primary means of acquiring AIDS.

w l m h are
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(Management's Eiiuiui 6} he made int. following statenient in paragraph t:
Both Division Di rector David Franchina and
Warden Jeff Galli were contacted to see if they
had second thoughts on the possibility of
terminating Sucher.
Both were vei y
sirongly
opposed to Lt. Sucher's continued employment.
Both felt he has exhibited a failure to adequately
support and enforce Department/Division policies,
has
1
antagonistic
Division

nf

administration's efforts and has been a catalyst
to
contention
rather
than
exercising
his
supervision/management
responsibilities
in
a
responsible manner.
This statement

seems to indicate

that

Warden Galli and

Director

Franchina, when asked if they had second thoughts about Sucher's termination,
considered
incident.

factors

other

than

those

arising

directly

out

of

the

Loya

Both Warden Galli and Director Franchina testified at the hearing.

Neither were cross-examined as to this statement.

Warden Galli testified that

he recommended termination because Loya was fully restrained and there was no
justification

in Sucher's

striking

him.

Director

Franchina

testified

he

recommended termination because of the real and potential harm and liability
to which Sucher's actions exposed the Prison, and because Sucher's rank of
Lieutenant required him to exercise leadership responsibilities and be a model
for others.
In a letter to Sucher (Management's Exhibit 16) advising Sucher that
he was recommending termination, Director Franchina said:
I have thoroughly reviewed the Proposed Action
prepared
by
Administrative
Law
Judge
Toby
Jacquez. Based on the decision and options and
penalties discussea in the aecision, it is my
recommendation to Executive Director Gary W.
DeLand that you be terminated from your employment
with the Department of Corrections. His decision
is based on the facts in the case, the position
you held at the time of the incident, and the real
and potential harm and liability to the Department
that may result from your action.
In view of the testimony of Warden Galli and Director Franchina at
the hearing and the statements made by Director Franchina in the above quoted
letter, it is the conclusion of the Hearing Examiner that their recommendation
for termination was based on the facts involved in the Loya incident and not
on other factors.
Even-Handed

Treatment

-

Testimony

was

given

concerning

several

instances during the period 1979 to 1982 in which correctional officers struck
or otherwise mishanaled inmates and were not terminated for their actions but

were given disciplinary penalties considerably less seve^p
reuciveu
»> *-'
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Berendson case (1984-1985):
restrained

inmate to the

floor.

District Court dismissed the case.

Officer Ron Berendson struck a partially
The inmate sued and the Uniteo States
In his Report and Recommendation to the

court, the United States Magistrate said (Managements Exhibit 19):
The facts of this case show that defendants did not use force
until after plaintiff used provoking language, employed force against
Officer Berendson, and refusea to comply with lawful requests. There
is no showing of wanton or excessive use of force. . . .
Sucher alleged that this incident went to a fact finding hearing and
no disciplinary action was taken.

The evidence does not disclose whether the

fact finding hearing took place before, during, or after the court trial.

The

Hearing Examiner can only conjecture that disciplinary action may not have
been taken in view of the Magistrate's finding set forth above.
Berendson case (1986):

Berendson was sent by Sucher, who was shift

leader on duty, to shake-down a cell.

The inmate's behavior was disruptive

and Berenason put an arm lock on him and pushed him into the cell.
fracas, Berendson knocked

During the

the inmate down, although Sucher saio that he

thought the inmate fell rather than being knocked aown.

No disciplinary

action was taken on this incident.
Corrections submitted Management's Exhibit 20, which purports to be
an investigative report on the incident by Investigator Russ Boyce.

Boyce

concluded that the inmate made physical threats which provoked the incident
and that Officer Berendson did what was necessary to control him.
Sucher claimed that Management's Exhibit 20 does not refer to the
same incident.

The Hearing Examiner is not positive but they appear to refer

to the same incident since both involve a problem in getting an inmate back
into his cell.
Berendson case (1987):

Sucher testified that Officer Ron Berendson

knocked down an inmate in the culinary.

The inmate had threateneo Berendson

earlier and when Berendson came into the culinary the inmate raised his arm
like he was going to hit Berendson.

No disciplinary action was taken.

wj^K-:--1- *--r*u-f:~ *-*~™,~+f«« o^ -*-o w hw nn Oxscip^nary action was
tal-« si in, ' - -*--c-: .•*.: ; >-I-M -ei cannot M o p e r i y evaluate I: a s inciaent.
Rodriguez case (1985): Sucher cited the Rodriguez incident as
supporting his position I h.il he hid no I receive even-handed treatment.
Mfficer Jerry Rodriguez got into a dispute with another officer on the Prison
yiuunds and a fight ensued,,
Management f s Exhibit 11 shows that during a terminal:ior i hearing or i
this incident Rodriguez voluntarily agreed to submit a letter of resignation.
FalfTia case (1985):

Sucher cited this incident as supporting his

p n s i * II II "„

Management'"o Exhibit 12 shows thai during a termination hearing for
certain acts of alleged malfeasance which, are set forth in the Exhibit,
Galvasino Palma stipuiatei""! 1 hrif I ie m 111 ri resign f m m Ivic. rmp 1 riymer il wi I hi the
Department i if fnrrecf Ionir
Tiu t iillo case (15?& ,
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this case, Trujiiio 1 s disc-r 1li ? was not as harsh as It
nowever, it does i iot si »ow « ^^. if leant disparity

treatment with that given Sucher in that Trujillo did not occupy a supervisory
position,

the

inmate

was

not

restrained,

and

the

incident

involved

a

dissimilar factual situation.
After consioering the foregoing incidents, it is the conclusion of
the Hearing Examiner that they do not demonstrate any significant disparity
since 1984 in Disciplinary treatment afforded others as compared with that
given Sucher.

There were two or three incidents cited by Sucher that could

not be properly evaluated because of insufficient information.
Sucher's Record:

Sucher1s employment record shows that he receivea

standard or above ratings in his performance evaluations.

He did receive a

"warning" letter, which was not placed in his personnel file, as a result of
the manner in which he hanaled an attempted escape.
Sucher tried to get the administration to develop a training program
in self defense, which Demonstrates his interest in improving training at the
Prison.
Several

witnesses

testified

that

Sucher

was

professional

and

cooperative in the way he handled his duties.

CONCLUSION:
The

Hearing

Examiner

has

carefully

considered

the

mitigating

circumstances discussed above and concludes that they present no sound basis
on

which

he

could

properly

modify

the

decision

of

the

Department

of

Corrections to terminate Lieutenant Sucher.

It is therefore the decision of

the

of

Hearing

Examiner

that

the

Department

Corrections

has

proved

by

substantial evidence that Lieutenant Sucher committed the acts complained of;
that Lieutenant Sucher1s conduct constituted malfeasance and/or misfeasance;
that under the circumstances his termination did not constitute excessive,
arbitrary or capricious discipline; and that Lieutenant Sucher was dismissed
for just cause.

ORDER;
The Department of Correction's terminaf.io'"
sustained.

DATED

this tf "~

* Lieutenant Sucher is

day of JANUARY,

K WRIGHT W < E R
hearing Officer
Personnel Review i
Enc.:

i

Mailing Certificate

Any appeal of this 'decision to Step 6 by either party must be
received in wi itiny witl iii i i 0 working aays ai the Persof ne\l Review Board
Office upon receipt of this decision.

M A I L I N G

C E R T I F I C A T E

I certify that a true and exact copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, DECISION AND ORDER at Step 5 has been sent to the
following:
84604;

Paul S. Sucher, the Grievant, at 481 East 2825 North, Provo, Utah

Ted Cooley and Ray Taylor, Employee Relations Representatives with the

Utah Public Employees1 Association;

Gary W. DeLand, Executive Director;

Lynn

J. Lund, Inspector General; Michael Sanders, Management Auditor, all with the
Department of Corrections, at 6100 South 300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah
84107;

David R. Franchina, Institutions Operations Director, and Jeff Galli,

Warden, Young Aault Correctional Facility, both at Utah State Prison, Draper,
Utah 84020.

DATED

this /cX

day of JANUARY, 1988.

DONA HILLMAN, Secretary
Utah Personnel Review Board

Any appeal of this decision to Step 6 by either party must be
received in writing within 10 working days at the Personnel Review Board
Office upon receipt of this decision.
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The Board's statutory authority is found under provision of the State
Personnel Management Act, at Utah Code Annotated (1988 Supp.), Sections 67-19et seq., especially Sections 67-19-20 through 67-19-25, which set forth the
Board f s responsibilities and appellate

jurisdiction.

The Board's

current

regulatory provisions have been promulgated as the Grievance Procedure Rules
(1987 edition).

This case has proceeded properly and timely to the Boara at

the appellate/Step 6 level of the State's Grievance Procedure.
assumed

jurisdiction

over

the

Appellant's

appeal

ana

The Board has

this

proceeding

constitutes the final step in the administrative review of appeals brought on
by employees under the State's codified Grievance Procedure.
Appellant's counsel included a Motion To Consider New Evidence which he
incorporated into his brief for the Step 6 appeal hearing.

In response, the

Agency filed a countermotion to deny the Board from considering new evidence
at either the Step 5 or Step 6 levels.

On November 30, 1988 the Boara offered

an opportunity for the parties' counsel to argue orally in support of their
respective motions.

In a Ruling On The Motion To Consiaer New Evidence,

issued December 7, 1988, the Board denied Appellant's motion to take new or
additional evidence.
Pursuant to proper notice, oral argument on the substantive issues of the
appeal occurred on December 13, 1988, following which the recora was closea at
Step 6.

The Board

deliberated

then

took

the case under

in an executive session.

advisement

ana

immediately

Being fully apprised of the facts,

premises and issues, together with consideration of both the written briefs
and oral arguments, the Board now makes and enters its findings, conclusions
and decision which are based upon the entire record of the eviaentiary/Step 5
proceedings.

I.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In a letter dated July 6, 1987, Lieutenant Paul S. Sucher was notified ana
invited to attend a hearing in his behalf scheduled for July 22, 1987.

The

purpose of the July 22 administrative hniTinrj wa* to determine ^ t " 3 l ] v
whether disciplinary penalties were warranted against Suchei, and "
should be the nature of those disciplinary sanct ions.
Specifically, Suchei was informed through ^ r * .st-mentionea J etter that
he:
. •
,
[A]nd a number of other s' ""
Involved in a
confrontation with inmate Greg Loya,
which, after
attempts had been made to convince Mr ^oya to return to
his cell, you and other staff were forced to place him in
handcuffs with his hands behind his back. When Mr. Loya
continued to struggle and to kick he was then placea in leg
shackles. He was then carried from the Sallyport at the
YACF to Unit II. During this process of carrying him,
Mr. Loya allegedly spit on you. At that point, it is
alleged that you struck Mr. Loya * itl your fist ano were
preparing to hit him again when another staff member
intervened. You then left the scene and Mr I oya was
conducted to his cell. (Mgt. Exh. 3.)
As a resuJ t, nt his alleged .involvement i i tl te just-described incident,
Suche J I
v ioiated tl le 1 ollowing Depar tmei it o 1 "
Corrections -ilicies an;: Procedure?Ac

u; conduct. i"uu fai led 1.11 respect
the legal right of Mr. Li \
The act of
striking him while he w..as lul J >/ restrained
violated this rule.

hi OL UJ'.3i I Unsatisfactory Performance. Your action i f
striking an inmate in restraints was a
demonstratioi i of unsatisfactory performance
for an officer i r i your position as a staff
supervisor
AE 02, 03.35

Endangering Conduct by Prison staff. Your
act of striking an inmate threatened the
safety, security and control of the
institutior i,

AE 02/03.37

Unlawful Conduct. i oui striking air i inmate
who was fully restrained with handcuffs and
leg shackles constitutes aii assault, as
defined by Utah law, and is an unlawful
action in violation of tl ids sec
(Mgt. Exh. 3.)

Therein, Sucher was warned that if management could prove that he ha a
struck a fully restrained inmate, even one who had spit upon him, Sucher would
be subject to serious disciplinary penalties.
Subsequently, the administrative factfinding hearing took place on July 22
and 27, 1987.

The Corrections' administrative law judge, in his Findings of

Fact No. 11, made a specific factual finding that:
11.

Immediately after being spit upon by Inmate Loya,
Lieutenant Sucher reacted by punching at ana striking
Inmate Loya in the mouth area. As Lieutenant Sucher
prepared to strike Inmate Loya a second time, the
officers with Lieutenant Sucher yelled for him (i.e.,
Sucher) to stop. Lieutenant Sucher then releasee his
hold on Inmate Loya and left the scene to wash his
face.
As the result of Lieutenant Sucher's blow,
Inmate Loya was bleeding from the mouth.
(Mgt. Exh. 2, Part II, p. 3.)

As a result of finaing aggravating circumstances present, the Department
of Corrections' aoministrative law judge recommended disciplinary penalties in
his August 17, 1987 Proposed Action, as follows:
This case is aggravated by the fact that a blow was
actually landed by Lieutenant Sucher on a fully restrained
offender, and also by the fact Lieutenant Sucher is in a
supervisory capacity.
In this case adequate cause, as
required
by Division of Personnel
Management
Rule
ll.b.(2)(d), is found to allow the termination of
Lieutenant Sucher. At a minimum, this examiner recommends
that he be demoted to a non-supervisory rank as allowed by
Division of Personnel Management Rule 11.1.(4)(c)(1), ana
that he be suspended without pay for thirty calendar days.
As per Division of Personnel Management Rule 10.b.(2), this
examiner would also suggest that he be referred for
personal counseling with Associated Behavior Consultants
and that he be transferred to a duty station that limits
interaction with offenders. (Ibid, p. 6.)

* The fourth charge against Sucher, that of unlawful conduct through a
violation of Corrections' policy AE 02/03.37, was dismissed at the
departmental hearing on July 22, 1987. (T. II, pp. 18-19)

After issuance of the foregoing Proposed Action, Director of Institutional
Operations at the Utah State Prison, David R. Franchina, recommended to the
Department of Corrections' Executive Director Gary W. DeLand that Sucher's
employment with the Utah State Prison be terminated.

According to Franchina,

his recommendation was based, at least in part, on the adduced
findings

set

forth

in

the

Proposed

Action,

the

level

of

factual

supervisory

responsibility held by Sucher at the time of the June 19 inciaent, as well as
the potential for harm and civil liability implicit in the act of striking a
fully restrained inmate.

(Mgt. Exh. 16.)

Prior to issuing his Final Order in the Sucher incident, Corrections'
Director DeLand offered

to meet

personally

with Sucher and

professional employee relations representative, Ray
occurred

on

September 1,

1987.

Later,

on

Taylor.

the latterfs
That

September 9,

meeting

Mr. Sucher's

representative was invited by DeLand to preview the Final Order prior to its
dissemination.

Under date of September 14, DeLand issued his Final Oraer,

which dismissed Sucher from employment with the Department of Corrections.
Upon

timely

appeal

pursuant

to

the

Grievance

Procedure,

an

evidentiary/Step 5 hearing was conducted under jurisdiction of a Personnel
Review Board hearing

officer.

In preparation

for the evidentiary/Step 5

proceeding, a Stipulation Of Facts ("Stipulation") was produced jointly by the
parties.

(See Jt. Exh. 1.)

During most of the Step 5 proceedings, Lt. Sucher

acted in a pro se capacity and represented himself and presented his case in
chief.

However, upon offering his testimony, Sucher's employee relations

representative
concluding

the

asked

him

questions,

evidentiary/Step

5

which

Sucher

proceedings,

then

answered.

the

parties

After
submitted

posthearing summations and closing arguments to the hearing officer; the
record at the evidentiary level was then closed.
The Board's trier of facts made a specific finding that:
14. Immediately after being spit upon by Loya, Loya was
observed to re-gather spit again by Officer Moody and
Sucher. Sucher then punched at Loya and struck him in the
mouth. As Sucher prepared to strike at Loya a second time,

Officer White yelled for him to stop and Sucher withhelo
his second punch. Loya then spit in Sucher1 s face a second
time. Sucher released his hold on Loya and left the scene
to wash his face. (Step 5 Decision, p. A.)
The hearing officer then made conclusions of law, among them that:
6.
Sucher violated the rules and procedures set forth in
the Department of Corrections Manual of Policy and
Procedure [sic] in that he struck in the mouth a fully
restrained prison inmate who spit in his face while the
inmate was being carried by four officers. The rules he
violated in doing so are:
AE 02/03.01
A.

Members will respect and protect the civil
and legal rights of all offenders.

AE 02/03.32
A

[sic] Members shall perform their
duties in a manner which will maintain
appropriate standards of efficiency and
effectiveness in carrying out the functions
and objectives of the Department.
•

•

*

7.
The actions of Sucher constituted malfeasance and/or
misfeasance.
8.
The Department of Corrections has sustainea its burden
of proof by substantial evidence that Sucher committed the
improper acts complained of and [that] Sucher's termination
should be sustained if mitigating factors do not warrant a
different disciplinary penalty. (Ibia., pp. 5-6.)
After concluding that Sucher had, indeed, struck inmate Loya while the
latter was being restrained by handcuffs and leg shackles, the Step 5 trier of
facts further concluded that:
. . . [I]t is the conclusion of the [Board's hearing
officer] that the Department of Corrections proved by
substantial evidence that Sucher committed the acts
complained of and that disciplinary action was warranted.
However, the appropriateness of the disciplinary action
taken must be examined in the light of whatever mitigating
circumstances may be present. (Ibid., p. 8.)

The

Step 5

hearing

officer

next

considered

six

separate

mitigating

circumstances on behalf of Sucher:
1.

Hit List

2.

Lack of Training

3.

Fear of AIDS

4.

Union Activities and Grievances

5.

Evenhanded Treatment

6.

Sucher1s [Employment] Record

Having considered the just-listed six mitigating

factors, the board's

hearing officer essayed "that they present no sound basis on which he could
properly modify the decision of [the Utah State Prison and] the Department of
Corrections to terminate Lieutenant Sucher."

(Ibid., p. 16.)

It is therefore the decision of the [Board's hearing
officer] that the Department of Corrections has provea by
substantial evidence that Lieutenant Sucher committed the
acts complained of; that Lieutenant Sucher1s conduct
constituted malfeasance an/or misfeasance; that under the
circumstances his termination did not constitute excessive,
arbitrary or capricious discipline; and that Lieutenant
Sucher was dismissed for just cause. (Ibid, p. 16.)
The Step 5 Decision, portions of which are quoted above, was issued on
January 12, 1988.

Subsequently, the matter came on appeal to Step 6 at the

appellate level of the Grievance Procedure.

II.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The event giving rise to Sucher's appeal from termination with the Utah
State Prison occurred on June 19, 1987.

At approximately 3:50 p.m., Young

Adult Correction Facility ("YACF") inmate Greg Loya flooded his cell in the

Star I

facility

by

plugging

his

toilet.

Captain

Tom

Bona

dispatched

Correctional Officer Gerald White together with an inmate plumber to unclog
Loya's toilet.
door.

Upon arriving at Loya's cell, Officer White openea the cell

Then, as soon as the cell door was opened, Loya immediately exited his

cell and departed from the Star I facility, even before the main entrance door
was secured.

Officers White and Jasper Blocker verbally comrnandea Loya to

return to his cell.

Loya, however, ignored these commands and continued on

his way.
After Loya exited from the Star I facility, Captain Tom Bona sounoea the
"ring-in," which is a signal for all inmates to promptly return to their
respective housing units.

The ring-in signal alerts the correctional staff

that a serious inmate problem is at hand and sets in motion a "lock-down" of
inmates.
Having departed the Star I facility, inmate Loya approached the Central
Control area (i.e., Building Six) of the YACF.
Control, Captain John Powers approached him.

As Loya arrived at Central

Captain Powers and inmate Loya

were standing in the foyer area, a position immediately north of the enclosea
Central Control area of Building Six.
wished to be taken to A-Block.

Loya then told Captain Powers that he

At this time Captain Powers heard the ring-in

signal, and with the approach of Captain Bona and Officers White ano blocker,
Powers realized that the signal haa been set off due to inmate Loya's leaving
his cell.
At

approximately

Captain Bona

arrived

Dennis Moody

also

the

same

time

at

Central

arrived

to

that

Control,

assist

Officers White,
Lieutenant Sucher

Captain Powers,

Blocker
and

and

Officer

Captain Bona,

and

Officers White and Blocker with inmate Loya.
Captain Bona ordered Sucher to place handcuffs on Loya, which Sucher
proceeded to do.

Captain Bona then instructed Loya to return to his cell in

Star I, at which time inmate Loya became highly agitated.

As Officer Moody moved in to place a leg iron on one of inmate Loya's
legs, the latter kicked at Moody.

Officer Moody deflected the kick with his

arm (receiving a cut on his nose from the kick) and secured a leg iron on one
of Loya's legs.

Officer Blocker then took hold of Loya's upper torso by

placing an arm around him while Officer White applied a wrist lock on Loya.
Captain Bona, Lieutenant Sucher, and Officer Moody secured the remaining leg
iron.

Sucher testified that he received a kick by Loya during this struggle

to put leg irons on Loya, receiving a cut on his wrist.
After

the

correctional

officers

had

restrained

Loya

with

handcuffs

fastened behind his back and had shackled his lower legs with leg irons,
inmate Loya still refused to return to his Star I cell. Due to his refusal to
even walk, Loya was then picked up bodily by the following YACF staff:

Sucher

(right leg), Moody (left leg), Blocker (left arm), ana White (right arm).
Loya was carried out of the foyer of Building Six in a faceup position toward
Star I.

Upon being carried about twenty feet from the Building Six foyer,

Loya shifted into an upright or sitting position from which he then spat in
Lieutenant Sucherfs face.
The critical factual
Number 14, which states:

finding made by the Board's trier of

Immediately after being spit upon by Loya, Loya was
observed to re-gather spit again by Officer Moody and
Sucher. Sucher then punched at Loya and struck him in the
mouth. As Sucher prepared to strike at Loya a secona time,
Officer White yelled for him to stop and Sucher withheld
his second punch. Loya then spit in Sucher's face a second
time. Sucher released his hold on Loya and left the scene
to wash his face. (Step 5 Decision, p. 4.)
Blocker, White, Powers and Bona each testified

to seeing blood

appear on Loya's lips or mouth area immediately after Sucher's first
reported swing.

As Sucher exited the scene of Loya's disturbance,

f

Loya s body was rotated and he was then turned facedown to curtail
his further spitting and struggling.

After being turned facedown,

he was carried toward his cell without further incident.

After

facts is

being carried facedown for a short distance, Loya requested to walk
on his own and was allowed to do so.
Meanwhile, Sucher, having released his hold on Loya's right leg,
and having backed away

following

the spitting/punching

episode,

promptly left the scene to wash his face as Loya was being carried
away to his cell.

III.
ISSUES

The two interrelated issues placed before the hearing officer at
Step 5 were:
1.

Was the Grievant dismissed for just cause?

2.

If not, what is the appropriate remedy?

In

his

ultimate

conclusion,

the

Board's

hearing

officer

sustained the termination of Lieutenant Sucher as being supportea by
just cause.
Sucher, as Appellant at Step 6, now shoulders the burdens of
proof and persuasion before the Board.
convince

the

Board

that

termination

Appellant's arguments to
was

not

warranted

in

his

circumstances include the following:
1.

The hearing officer erred in ruling that Sucher's conduct
constituted
compelling

either

malfeasance

consideration

of

or

additional

misfeasance,

thus

evidence

the

on

issue of self-defense to a threat of exposure to the AIDS
virus.

2.

Substantial evidence was not present to show that Sucher struck the
inmate.

3.

The hearing officer erred in not reversing or mitigating Sucher1s
penalty of dismissal in light of the circumstances and in comparison
with other disciplinary actions.

Contained within argument number 1, above, Appellant offered a motion for
the Board to consider new evidence bearing on the issue of whether a "bona
fide fear of contracting AIDS [Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome] justifies
the use of force against an inmate who is restrained by hano ana ankle
cuffs."

(Appellant's Brief, p. 1.)

In light of the above arguments offered on Appellant's behalf, the Board's
duty is to review the Step 5 Decision, including the record in its entirety,
and to determine whether the hearing officer made accurate findings of fact,
whether those factual findings have been correctly applied to the law, and
whether the Step 5 Decision's conclusions of law are accurate and supportable
by the adduced facts.

These same findings and conclusions must rationally

support the ultimate conclusion of law, i.e., the hearing officer's ruling.
The scope of review is set

forth in the Board's promulgated

Grievance Procedure Rules (1987), at p. 30:
26.8 Standards of Review.
based upon the following:

The Board's decisions shall be

26.8.1
The Board's appellate decisions
supported by credible substantial eviaence.

shall

be

26.8.2 The Board's standards of review consist of
determining:
(1) whether
the
hearing
officer's
evidentiary decision was supported by substantial
evidence; (2) whether that decision is warranted by
the facts and circumstances of the case on appeal; and
(3) whether the hearing officer's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law are correct and accurate based upon
the evidence.

rules:

After reviewing the evidentiary record in its entirety, the Board finds
grounds for reversing the hearing officer with respect to Sucher's termination
and modifies the evidentiary determination accordingly.

IV.
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
A.

Findings of Fact of Record.
The parties jointly submitted a Stipulation of Facts document (Jt. Exh. 1)

into the record prior to the evidentiary/Step 5 proceeding.

That oocument

contains 11 stipulated factual statements.
The Board's trier of facts entered an additional 19 separate finaings of
fact.

The Board adopts all of these evidentiary factual findings and hereby

incorporates them into this oecision.

The Step 5 findings of facts are

determined to be accurate and to have been correctly applied to the law.
B.

The Board's Findings and Analysis.
The Board now enters the following

five specific factual findings in

support of its determination:
1.

Sucher's Proclaimed Fear of AIDS.
We have

determined

that

Appellant

did,

indeed,

have

a

genuine

subjective fear of AIDS being transmitted by Loya's saliva when it came
into contact with his face.
with

Sucher's

pp. 3-4.)

The

bare

Inmate Loyafs saliva came into direct contact

face.

reasonableness

(Findings

Nos. 13,

of Sucher's

14,

Step 5

Decision,

fear of catching

the AIDS

contagion through saliva landing on his facial area may not have been
objectively appropriate.

Nonetheless, Sucher had an immediate subjective

fear of catching AIDS, which was manifested by his spontaneous utterance:
"I'm charging you [Loya] with assault for a deadly weapon." (Sucher:
T. Ill, p. 32, T. IV,

p. 42; Moody:

T. II, pp. 152-53; White:

T. I,

p. 150.)
We further find, however, that Sucher was not singularly motivated by
an interest in his self defense as he claimed, but that he lunged forward,
swung at, and hit Loya in the mouth area with his fist as a retaliatory
act for having been spit upon by the inmate.
2.

AIDS and Staff Training.
Sucher did not receive appropriate training or adequate notice of how

to properly respond to a situation in which an inmate —

a potential

AIDS-infected person or a suspected carrier with the condition of AIDS
Related

Complex, which

is also

referred

to as ARC and

Pre-AIDS

—-

threatens to spit or otherwise transmit his saliva to the exposed skin of
correctional staff.
There

was no showing

of evidence

that

the Agency

at any

time

previously offered training on the nature or prevention of AIDS to either
Sucher or any correctional staff.
pp. 94, 159-60.

(Blocker: T. I, p. 197; White: T. I,

White misstated that the subject AIDS memo was aaaressea

to staff, rather than to inmates.)

Neither was there a showing of any

evidence that the Agency haa distributea any educational, instructional,
or

other

training

materials

regarding

the

AIDS

contagion

to

the

correctional officers, such as Sucher.
Appellant claimed to have found on the prison grounds an "Office
Memorandum" addressed to "Utah State Prison Inmates," dated November 5,
1985, and entitled "AIDS."

(Mgt. Exh. 25.)

Sucher stated that he haa

read this brochure. (T. Ill, p. 135, T. IV, pp. 29-35)
addressed specifically to inmates.
only through happenstance.

_ 1-x _

This brochure was

Sucher's acquisition of a copy was

While the brochure states that, "There is no evidence that AIDS is
spread by" sneezing, coughing, spitting or other kinds of common daily
occurrences (Ibid., p. 2.), the brochure also advised that the risk of
acquiring AIDS could be reduced by avoiding "the sharing of cigarettes,
razors, toothbrushes, and manicure sets."

(Ibid, p. 3.)

Sucher recalled

during the Step 5 proceedings that the brochure oirected to inmates also
warned about the sharing of cigarettes, razors, toothbrushes, arinking and
eating utensils, and the like.

(T. Ill, p. 135, T. IV, pp. 30-31, 33, 37.)

Sucher's fear of AIDS being contracted through saliva was genuine,
and affected his actions on June 19, 1987, even if his fear was also
misguided as well as unreasonable.

Albeit the Agency did not show that

proper training, orientation, or educational instruction regaraing AIDS in
a custodial

setting had been offered previous to the Loya incident.

Consequently, Sucher was not properly trained or instructed on AIDS anent
his inmate custodianship

responsibilities, especially

with

respect

to

inmates spitting on correctional staff vis-a-vis AIDS.
3.

Sucher Used Unreasonable Force.
Sucher's conduct of striking Loya in the mouth, in light of the

totality of the circumstances, was not appropriate or reasonable, but
rather his act of punching Loya constituted excessive force.

In the

totality of the circumstances, with inmate Loya confined by hanacuffs
behind him and with leg irons securing his lower limbs, with three other
correctional

officers besides Sucher

holding

onto

Loya's extremities,

Sucher's act of retaliation to Loya's spitting by punching Loya's mouth
was an application of unreasonable force.
4.

Sucher's Termination Constituted Excessive Discipline.
In light of the Board's above-stated three findings, the hearing

officer's conclusion that Sucher's termination was warranted

fails to

comport with the the Board's standard of review that the Step 5 decision
must be "warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case on appeal."
(Grievance

Procedure

Rules,

26.8.2.)

The

evidentiary

examiner's

conclusion and ruling was neither arbitrary nor capricious, just excessive
anent the penalty in light of the totality of the facts and circumstances
regarding the Loya incident.
5.

Sucher's Reliance Upon the Claim of Self Defense.
Appellant asserted that his act of striking Loya subsequent to being

spit upon was one of self defense.

We do not agree.

As stated in Finaing

No. 1, above, Sucher committed an act of retaliation for having been spit
upon in the facial area by Loya.
inappropriate

because Sucher could

measures to prevent

further

saliva contact, from Loya.
to:

Sucher1 s response of striking Loya was
have

spitting,

taken
and

reasonable,

therefore

alternative

possible

further

These measures include, but are not limited

turning aside, turning his back, ducking his head down, putting forth

his hand as a block, stepping backwards and away, all of which stand in
contrast to his having assaulted Loya with a physical blow of the fist.
Considered in the total context of the Loya incident, Sucher1s act of
punching Loya in the mouth was not the act that a reasonable person would
take in the same situation.
claim

is found

Thus, Sucher1s reliance upon a self defense

to have been unreasonable, without merit, and wholly

inappropriate as a response.

V.
LEGAL CONCLUSIONS
The trier of facts entered the following specific conclusion of law:
5. Discipline of a merit covered State employee must not
be excessive, arbitrary or capricious. (Step 5 Decision,
p. 5.)

Subsequently, the Step 5 hearing officer made the following general ultimate
legal conclusion:
. . [T]hat Lieutenant Sucher1s conduct constituteo
malfeasance and/or misfeasance . . . .
[sic] (Step 5
Decision, p. 16.)
The Board legally concludes, pursuant to factual finding number four,
above, that the Agency's dismissal of Sucher constituted excessively severe
punishment in light of the record considered as a whole.

The hearing officer

performed a commendable task of setting forth accurate findings of fact.
However, after a considerate review of the entire record, the Board makes a
different ultimate legal conclusion than did the hearing officer.

The penalty

imposed on Sucher was excessive given the facts and circumstances of the Loya
incident.

Even though aggravating and mitigating factors have been previously

raised and weighed at lower administrative levels, the Boara concludes that
greater deference must be accoraed the fact that Sucher and other correctional
staff had not been offered or received sufficient training on how to respond
to spitting and saliva transmittal with respect to the AIDS contagion during
inmate-correctional

staff confrontations, such as the Loya inciaent.

The

record is absent any showing of training, education, and instruction offered
by the Agency on the AIDS subject as applicable to its correctional officer
staff.
Based upon the Board's foregoing factual findings ana the just-noted legal
conclusion, the Step 5 decision is vacated.

Sucher is ordered to be returned

to employment with the Utah State Prison and the Department of Corrections
conditioned upon the remedy provided below.

IV.
DECISION AND REMEDY

Based upon the Board's foregoing findings and ultimate conclusion, Sucher

is ordered to be returned to full duty by the employing agency, the Utah State
Prison, conditioned as follows:
1.

Sucher is to be returned to employment at the Utah State Prison in a

Correctional Officer III position, or at a higher level if the Agency's
administration prefers.

His salary is to be reduced by ten percent from

his former rate of $11.06 per hour, which he was earning on June 19, 1987.
2.

Sucher is to be returned to duty and placed on the Agency's payroll

coincident to January 7, 1989, which is the beginning of a state payroll
period.
3.

Sucher is not to be reinstated with back pay and benefits for the

period from September 14, 1987 through January 7, 1989.
4.

Sucher shall not accrue annual leave, sick leave, or holiaay time

during

the

period

of

his

absence

from

September 1, 1987

through

January 7, 1989.
5.

The period of absence from September 14, 1987 through January 7, 1989

shall be treated as an administrative leave without pay, curing which no
seniority accrues, nor does that time count toward the annual leave and
sick leave accrual rates.
6.

Sucher's return to duty shall be at the discretion of management as

to shift and duty assignments.
7.

This decision is to be a permanent document in Sucher's personnel

file as maintained by the Agency.
8.

The Board retains jurisdiction over the above-stated remedy.

Any

disagreements or disputes regarding the interpretation or application of
the above remedy, as well as over any need for additional clarification of
the terms and conditions of employment arising from the application of
this remedy, shall be resolved by the Board, if so petitioned, for as long
as 90 days after issuance of this decision.

DECISION UNANIMOUS.
Bruce T. Jones, Chairman
Jean M. Bishop, Member
David M. Hilbig, Member
Jose L. Trujillo, Member

DATED

this

\*\

day of December 1988.

Utah Personnel Review Board

Robert N. White, SPHR
™
Administrator
Utah Personnel Review Board

^

Enc: Mailing Certificate
Any appeal from the Board's decision must be made within 20 calendar days
from issuance of this decision to the Utah Court of Appeals. On appeal to the
Utah Court of Appeals, the Board's findings of fact, if supported by
substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, Section 63-46b-16.
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